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PROTECTING TENANTS AT FORECLOSURE 
BY FUNDING NEEDED REPAIRS 
Steven T. Hasty* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, the investment group Milbank Real Estate Services 
effectively abandoned1 ten apartment towers it owned in the 
Bronx and defaulted on its $35 million mortgage loan.2 By all 
accounts, the buildings were in serious disrepair: the roofs 
leaked, rats and roaches infested the apartments, and several 
units were fire-damaged.3 Some of the 548 units were 
uninhabitable and vacant, but most had tenants living in them.4 
After Milbank stopped paying the mortgage, the mortgagee (a 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2013; B.A., New York University, 
2007. Many thanks to Ian Davie of Legal Services N.Y.C.–Bronx and Shira 
Galinsky of South Brooklyn Legal Services for providing helpful background, 
to Professor Jessica Attie for her insightful comments, and to the editorial 
staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their input and suggestions. 
1 See generally Hearing on Intros. 494, 500, & 501 Before the Comm. 
on Hous. & Bldgs. of the N.Y.C. Council, 2011 Leg., 2011 Sess. 164–65 
(N.Y. Apr. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Elizabeth M. 
Lynch, MFY Legal Servs.) (“It is a fact that some owners abandon their 
property once a foreclosure action is commenced. . . . [But] homeowners 
. . . in one- to four-family houses, rarely abandon their homes.”). 
2 Tenant-Defendants Memorandum of Law at 1–5, Milbank, No. 
380454/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Mar. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Milbank 
Tenants’ Memorandum of Law]. 
3 Id. at 3–4. There were 4,300 housing code violations on record at the 
time the tenants filed their motion seeking payment from the mortgagee to 
cover repairs; 756 were classified as “immediately hazardous.” Id. at 3; 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Milbank, No. 380454/09 [hereinafter 
Milbank Transcript]. 
4 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
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mortgage-backed securities trust)5 began a foreclosure action and 
asked the court to appoint a receiver to take control of the 
properties.6 Although the securities trust had advanced some 
funds for taxes and water bills, the court-appointed receiver had 
only a very modest rental income from the properties and could 
not afford to make repairs.7 As the foreclosure case dragged on, 
some of the tenants began to withhold rent because of poor 
housing conditions.8  
In April 2010, the tenants moved the foreclosure court for an 
order compelling the plaintiff mortgagee to provide enough 
funds to enable the receiver to make repairs.9 The tenants 
estimated that it would cost $17–25 million to rehabilitate the 
buildings,10 but the defendant Milbank was unwilling (or unable) 
to pay for even emergency repairs.11 Relying on ten-year-old 
                                                          
5 The parties are described in detail infra at notes 157–62 and in the 
accompanying text. 
6 Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
Receivership is discussed in greater detail below in Part II. 
7 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 12, 18.  
8 Id. at 12; Amended Affidavit of Cicciu at para. 12, Milbank, No. 
380454/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Mar. 17, 2009) (“[M]uch of this 
arrearage may not be collectible because many tenants are invoking the 
defense of breach of the warranty of habitability.”). 
9 Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1. The 
tenants were named as “‘John Doe’ Nos. 1–25” in the foreclosure action. 
Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 16. 
10 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 7. 
11 See Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 5. Some 
of the entities that held title to Milbank’s properties have entered bankruptcy. 
Dakota Smith, Downtown’s Roosevelt Lofts Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 
CURBED LA (Apr. 14, 2009), http://la.curbed.com/archives/2009/04/ 
downtowns_roosevelt_lofts_files_for_chapter_11_bankruptcy.php. According 
to its press release, however, “[t]here is no direct legal relationship between 
Roosevelt Lofts, LLC and Milbank Real Estate Services, Inc. Milbank is thus 
not affected by Roosevelt’s Chapter 11 filing, and continues to operate its 
various business operations and real estate ventures without interruption or 
oversight by the Bankruptcy Court.” Id. Milbank’s website has remained 
static and unchanged since 2008, and its status is unknown. See What’s New, 
MILBANK, http://www.milbankre.com/whatsnew.php (last visited May 10, 
2012) (listing press releases, the newest of which is dated October 2008). 
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appellate court dicta12 and employing a four-factor equitable 
test,13 the court ordered the mortgagee to advance $2.5 million 
to the receiver during the foreclosure action to cover the cost of 
correcting the immediately hazardous conditions in Milbank’s 
buildings.14 While this outcome was an important victory for 
Milbank’s Bronx tenants, it is unfortunately not the norm.15 
During the gap period between an owner’s default and a 
judgment of foreclosure, tenants too often face uninhabitable 
conditions that go long uncorrected.16 
Among the victims of the current mortgage foreclosure 
crisis, tenants of buildings in foreclosure are often innocent, 
harmed, and overlooked.17 A nonresident investor-owner may 
                                                          
12 See Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 10, 20 (discussing Fourth 
Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589–90 (App. 
Div. 1997)). 
13 The court examined (1) the degree of necessity of the expenses, (2) 
whether a benefit would accrue to the party who requested that a receiver be 
appointed, (3) whether the foreclosing mortgage lender was aware that the 
building’s income would be insufficient to pay the receiver’s expenses when 
it asked that one be appointed, and (4) whether the funds would be judicially 
expended. Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 10, 12–13, 18–19. 
14 Milbank, No. 380454/09 (granting motion “for reasons stated on the 
record”); Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 20. 
15 See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Bank v. Browne, No. 27151/08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Kings Cnty. Oct. 5, 2009) (denying a motion similar to that granted in 
Milbank, but granting tenants leave to bring a separate action in Housing 
Court); Union Sav. Bank v. 285 Lafayette Assocs., N.Y. L.J., May 20, 
1992, at 21 (finding no remedy at law and denying an equitable remedy to 
tenants where deficiencies in the building predated the bank’s involvement). 
16 Raun J. Rasmussen, Foreclosure Crisis: Both Owners, Many Tenants 
to Be Homeless, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.newyorklawjournal. 
com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202427485794&slreturn=1. 
17 Armin Bazikyan, Renters: The Innocent Victims of the Foreclosure 
Mortgage Crisis, 39 SW. L. REV. 339, 344 (2009) (“The plight of the renter 
has become a silent problem.”); Vicki Been & Allegra Glashausser, Tenants: 
Innocent Victims of the Nation’s Foreclosure Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 
1, 3 (2009) (“[R]enters are often completely unaware that their landlords are 
in default until utilities are shut off or an eviction notice appears on their 
door.”); Tony S. Guo, Tenants at Foreclosure: Mitigating Harm to Innocent 
Victims of the Foreclosure Crisis, 4 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 215 (2011); 
Danilo Pelletiere & Keith Wardrip, Renters and the Housing Credit Crisis, 
POVERTY & RACE (Poverty & Race Research Action Council, Wash., D.C.), 
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endure a lengthy foreclosure proceeding and suffer a serious 
financial setback,18 but the resident-tenants of a property in 
foreclosure must literally live with the consequences19—from 
leaks and recurrent mold to broken appliances and lack of heat 
and hot water.20 Although the primary threat to tenants at 
foreclosure is eviction by usual means,21 they also face the threat 
of constructive eviction because of uninhabitable conditions.22 
The owner of a multiple dwelling in foreclosure typically has 
inadequate funds to make repairs required by the applicable 
housing code and the implied warranty of habitability (the basic 
guarantee that a rented residence will be livable), leaving tenants 
especially vulnerable.23  
Further, a judicial foreclosure action may take years to 
resolve,24 and the presence of a court-appointed receiver may 
                                                          
July/Aug. 2008, at 3, available at http://www.prrac.org/full_text.php?text_ 
id=1189&item_id=11271&newsletter_id=100.  
18 Rasmussen, supra note 16. 
19 Memorandum of Law of Proposed Amicus Curiae, The Council of the 
City of New York, in Support of Tenants’ Motion at 5, Nat’l Bank of 
N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 
Nov. 16, 2009) [hereinafter City Council Amicus Brief] (“[T]housands of 
tenants in multifamily rental properties risk being exposed to substandard 
living conditions due to decisions they did not make.”). 
20 Rasmussen, supra note 16. 
21 See Eloisa Rodriguez-Dod, Stop Shutting the Door on Renters: 
Protecting Tenants from Foreclosure Evictions, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 243, 245, 247 (2010). Tenants may also risk losing their security 
deposits. Been & Glashausser, supra note 17, at 3. 
22 Raun J. Rasmussen, When a Landlord Disappears; Bank Held Liable 
for Maintaining Building During Foreclosure, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1996, at 
29. “A constructive eviction occurs when there is an abandonment by the 
tenant because the continued beneficial use of the premises is impossible.” 
Manhattan Mansions v. Moe’s Pizza, 561 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (Civ. Ct. 
1990). 
23 Rasmussen, supra note 16. New York, like many other states, has 
codified the warranty of habitability. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b 
(McKinney 2006). 
24 Amy C. Cutts & William A. Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage 
Default, in BORROWING TO LIVE 204–05 (Nicholas P. Retsinas & Eric S. 
Belsky eds., 2008) (“The foreclosure process varies widely across states . . . 
[and] lasts an average of 355 days between the due date of the last payment 
 Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure 585 
introduce additional complexity—such as requiring court 
approval of, or the lender’s consent to, larger expenses.25 
Usually, a temporary receiver has only the income from current 
rents to pay for upkeep.26 When a building needs a new roof or 
boiler, for example, such a major expenditure may be 
impossible without financial assistance from the owner or 
lender.27  
Tenants should not have to bear these costs by enduring 
falling plaster, peeling paint, recurrent mold, and inadequate 
heat and hot water, nor should tenants be constructively evicted 
by housing conditions so unlivable that they are the equivalent of 
a sheriff or city marshal executing a warrant of eviction. Where 
an owner has resources and is subject to a court’s jurisdiction, 
the tenants can often hold the owner directly accountable.28 But 
where an owner has filed for bankruptcy or has abandoned a 
failing investment property, the foreclosing lender should step in 
to pay for needed repairs.29 Further, fairness may require the 
lender to pay where the owner’s default was inevitable because 
the lender recklessly made an oversized loan, incentivizing the 
owner to pressure low-income tenants to leave by withholding 
                                                          
made and the loss of the home at a foreclosure sale, but ranged from 248 to 
598 days.”). More recent estimates reflect the full impact of the crisis. See 
Susan Saulny, When Living in Limbo Avoids Living on the Street, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/us/when-living-
in-limbo-avoids-living-on-the-street.html (“In New York, the time to 
complete a foreclosure has almost quadrupled, from 263 days in 2007 to 
1,019 days in 2011.”). 
25 See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Sept. 9, 2010) (limiting receiver to repairs 
costing $2,000 or less absent prior court approval or lender consent). 
26 Andrew L. Herz et al., What to Expect When a Receiver Takes over a 
Troubled Property (With Mortgage Foreclosure Receiver’s Checklist), PRAC. 
REAL EST. LAW., Sept. 2011, at 33, 35; see also infra Part II. 
27 See Rasmussen, supra note 22. 
28 Rasmussen, supra note 16. 
29 Id. (“[M]any landlords in foreclosure simply won’t show up; a default 
judgment does little to get repairs completed.”); see also Tess Vigeland, They 
Walked Away, and They’re Glad They Did, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/your-money/life-goes-on-some-find-
after-leaving-an-underwater-mortgage.html (describing process of mortgagors 
avoiding legal proceedings through careful timing). 
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repairs.30 Some states and local governments have passed laws 
requiring foreclosing mortgage lenders to pay for postjudgment 
upkeep.31 But for innocent renters who must cope with poor 
housing conditions during the foreclosure action—from the 
mortgagor’s default until judgment—these laws leave substantial 
gaps, often spanning years.32 
This Note argues that courts should extend application of 
Milbank’s equitable rule to hold foreclosing lenders accountable 
for interim repairs, out of fairness to innocent tenants who face 
constructive eviction during a foreclosure. Part II provides 
background on judicial mortgage foreclosure actions and the role 
of temporary receivers. Part III surveys the remedies currently 
available for tenants and demonstrates why these measures 
inadequately protect tenants by leaving a gap period—between 
default and judgment—during which no one is held responsible 
for substandard housing conditions. Part IV examines the 
Milbank case and the grounds for holding lenders financially 
responsible for interim repairs. Part V argues that courts should 
apply Milbank’s equitable test to determine whether the 
mortgage lender in a foreclosure action should bear the cost of 
remediating serious housing code and warranty of habitability 
violations during the pendency of the action, where other 
financial sources are inadequate. Extending the rule 
complements existing law requiring postjudgment upkeep, helps 
prevent neighborhood blight, and places the burden of repairing 
abandoned apartment buildings on the party best able to bear the 
cost.  
Recognizing that the application of a powerful yet 
manipulable equitable rule may be somewhat uneven, Part VI 
recommends that state legislatures establish a duty on the part of 
foreclosure plaintiffs to pay for needed repairs to multiple 
                                                          
30 See infra Part III. 
31 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 2009); 
Mark Oltmanns, City Fights to Keep Banks Accountable for Blight in 
Foreclosed Homes, RICHMOND CONFIDENTIAL (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://richmondconfidential.org/2011/02/10/city-fights-to-keep-banks-
accountable-for-blight-in-foreclosed-homes/. 
32 See City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 8; Rasmussen, supra 
note 22. 
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dwellings. Additionally, states might require foreclosure 
plaintiffs to post a compliance bond to cover the anticipated cost 
of needed repairs. As of this writing, the New York City 
Council is considering adopting similar legislation, yet if the 
effort is successful, the local laws face possible preemption 
challenges. Meanwhile, at the state level, reform faces 
significant practical and political hurdles. Finally, while this 
Note focuses on New York law, the argument for the extension 
of an equitable rule may have wider implications for many U.S. 
jurisdictions with judicial foreclosure processes. 
II. TENANTS AT FORECLOSURE AND THE ROLE OF THE RECEIVER 
Thirty-six states permit both judicial and nonjudicial 
foreclosures; the other fourteen, New York among them, require 
a judicial process.33 In New York, the entire process can take 
years.34 A foreclosure action usually begins when the borrower 
(the mortgagor) fails to make payments under the associated 
promissory note.35 Then, the lender (the mortgagee) may file an 
action to foreclose on the mortgaged property.36 Many actions 
settle, but if the action proceeds to judgment, the mortgagee will 
                                                          
33 NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NAT’L LOW INCOME 
HOUS. COAL., WITHOUT JUST CAUSE: A 50-STATE REVIEW OF THE (LACK OF) 
RIGHTS OF TENANTS IN FORECLOSURE 7, 7 n. 4 (2009) [hereinafter WITHOUT 
JUST CAUSE], available at http://www.nlchp.org/content/pubs/Without_Just_ 
Cause1.pdf. Nonjudicial foreclosures vary in their precise mechanics, but 
typically do not involve a judge unless the borrower seeks judicial 
intervention. Id. at 7. 
34 ALVIN L. ARNOLD, REAL ESTATE INVESTOR’S DESKBOOK § 11:32 (3d 
ed. 2011) (describing reasons some mortgagees seek a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure, one of them being to avoid the delay and expense of a judicial 
foreclosure proceeding); Herz et al., supra note 26, at 34. 
35 NEIGHBORHOOD ECON. DEV. ADVOCACY PROJECT, PATHS OF A 
FORECLOSURE IN NEW YORK STATE (2010), http://www.ahphome.org/library/ 
path_of_a_forecosure.pdf [hereinafter PATHS OF A FORECLOSURE]. A 
mortgage follows the promissory note and remains enforceable by the note 
holder as it changes hands. N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 9-203(g) (McKinney 2002); 
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Pietranico, 928 N.Y.S.2d 818, 829 (Sup. 
Ct. 2011). 
36 PATHS OF A FORECLOSURE, supra note 35. 
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typically request that the court appoint a referee to sell the 
property to the highest bidder, in order to satisfy the mortgage 
debt.37 
In New York, a judgment of foreclosure severs a tenancy, 
provided the tenant was made a party to the foreclosure action,38 
(though Part III describes some important exceptions to this). 
Tenants are often named as John or Jane Does in the foreclosure 
action and are subject to the orders of the foreclosure court.39 
During the foreclosure action, however, the tenancy continues, 
and the same lease terms and rent remain in effect.40 For a bank 
holding the mortgage note on a multiple dwelling, often an 
investment property, it is problematic for the property to 
languish and rents go uncollected.41 A receiver solves this 
problem, acting as a temporary caretaker, taking in the 
building’s income and maintaining its condition, both for the 
lender as well as the current occupants.42 In New York, 
foreclosure plaintiffs often seek receivers for apartment buildings 
with six units or more.43 
                                                          
37 Id. 
38 6820 Ridge Realty LLC v. Goldman, 701 N.Y.S.2d 69 (App. Div. 
1999) (holding that where tenant was not joined in foreclosure action, new 
owner’s remedy was eviction proceeding, not writ of assistance). Other states 
do not require that tenants be made parties to the foreclosure action. 
WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 33, at 8. 
39 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 16. But see 103rd Funding 
Assocs. v. Salinas Realty Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 47, 49 (App. Div. 2000) 
(failing to intervene below, tenants lacked standing to appeal trial court 
order). 
40 Ifantides v. Mikeway Enter., Inc., N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 1991, at 25 
(“[A]bsent fraud or collusive action in anticipation of foreclosure or 
receivership, pending a judgment of foreclosure and sale the receiver may not 
collect a higher rent from a tenant than is stipulated in a lease.”). Renewal 
leases entered into during the foreclosure action may change the amount of 
rent or other terms of the tenancy. Herz et al., supra note 26, at 37–38. 
41 See Herz et al., supra note 26, at 33–34. 
42 Id.  
43 See Holmes v. Gravenhorst, 188 N.E. 285, 286 (N.Y. 1933) (“Where 
. . . the mortgagor is not in possession during the foreclosure of [the] 
mortgage . . . and the premises are occupied by tenants . . . a receiver may 
be appointed in a proper case to take possession of the premises, collect the 
rents, and apply them to the payment of the carrying charges on the property 
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A temporary receiver is an officer of the court, and one may 
be appointed at the request of the parties to the action, typically 
the mortgagee-plaintiff.44 Even though the mortgage agreement 
may provide for a receiver, courts “exercise extreme caution in 
appointing receivers . . . because such appointment [generally] 
results in the taking and withholding of possession of property 
from a party without an adjudication on the merits.”45 
Appointing a receiver effectively terminates the mortgagor’s 
right to collect rents but not its ownership of the property.46 
Technically, the owner holds title until the final judgment of 
foreclosure, even though a court’s order appointing the receiver 
may require the owner to surrender possession.47  
State law makes clear that the receiver has only those powers 
conferred by the appointing order.48 The receiver’s presence “is 
intended to protect the lender from the risk that the borrower 
will mismanage the property or misappropriate 
revenue . . . [and] to assure that the property does not 
deteriorate under the control of a distracted and penniless 
borrower.”49 Appointing a receiver also allows the lender to 
insulate itself from liability that could result were it deemed a 
“mortgagee-in-possession.”50 Acquiring the status of a 
                                                          
and the reduction of the mortgage debt.”). Anecdotally, receivership is not 
often used for smaller multifamily buildings. Rasmussen, supra note 16. 
44 Herz et al., supra note 26, at 34 (“Any well-drafted mortgage usually 
states that the holder of the mortgage can have a receiver appointed if the 
lender starts a foreclosure action.”). 
45 Jacobowitz v. Jacobowitz, 798 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sup. Ct. 2004) 
(unpublished table decision) (quoting Hahn v. Garay, 387 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 
(App. Div. 1976)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
46 In re Koula Enters, Ltd., 197 B.R. 753, 758 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(applying New York law). 
47 See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Sept. 9, 2010) (“All persons now or hereafter in 
possession of said premises or any part thereof and not holding such 
possession under valid and existing leases or tenancies do forthwith surrender 
such possession to said Receiver, subject to emergency laws, if any.”). 
48 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6401(b) (McKinney 2010); Daro Indus., Inc. v. RAS 
Enters., 380 N.E.2d 160, 161 (N.Y. 1978). 
49 Herz et al., supra note 26, at 33–34. 
50 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-101 (McKinney 2010) (“A receiver of 
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“mortgagee-in-possession” will not equate the mortgagee’s rights 
and duties with those of an owner.51 But a receiver’s rights, 
duties, and powers are even more limited in scope, allowing the 
mortgagee to limit its potential liability and to insulate itself 
from most direct claims.52 
For its necessary expenses, the receiver has priority over 
other creditors when the property is sold.53 A receiver’s 
necessary expenses, including the cost of complying with legal 
duties like the warranty of habitability, “constitute a first charge 
or lien against the receivership property and funds . . . [with] 
priority over preexisting liens of mortgagees,”54 including the 
plaintiff-mortgagee’s lien.55 Thus, even when the sale price 
yields less than the amount of the loan, the receiver’s necessary 
interim expenses will usually be covered.56 Additionally, upon 
judgment, the receiver may apply for reimbursement from the 
mortgagee for necessary expenses incurred during the action.57 
Thus, the receiver can be made whole even without a sale: if the 
lender takes title to the property and keeps it on its books as real 
estate owned, the receiver may seek reimbursement of necessary 
expenditures directly from the foreclosing mortgagee.58 
In New York, a receiver is considered an owner for 
                                                          
rents and profits appointed in an action to foreclose a mortgage upon real 
property shall be liable, in his official capacity, for injury to person or 
property sustained by reason of conditions on the premises, in a case where 
an owner would have been liable.”); Mortimer v. E. Side Sav. Bank, 295 
N.Y.S. 695, 699 (App. Div. 1937) (finding mortgagee-in-possession liable as 
owner); Herz et al., supra note 26, at 34. 
51 Trajam Realty Corp. v. Hirschfeld, 452 N.Y.S.2d 37, 39–40 (App. 
Div. 1982). 
52 Herz et al., supra note 26, at 38. 
53 91 N.Y. JUR. 2D Receivers § 44 (2004) (citing Farmers’ Loan & Trust 
Co. v. Bankers’ & Merchants’ Tel. Co., 42 N.E. 707 (N.Y. 1896)). 
54 Id. 
55 91 N.Y. JUR. 2D Receivers § 84 (2004) (citing Vill. of Stillwater v. 
Hudson Valley Ry. Co., 174 N.E. 306 (N.Y. 1931); Cent. Trust Co. of 
N.Y. v. Pittsburgh, S. & N.R., Co., 119 N.E. 565 (N.Y. 1918)). 
56 See Corcoran v. Joseph M. Corcoran, Inc., 521 N.Y.S.2d 757, 760 
(App. Div. 1987) (allowing receiver to recover attorney’s fees). 
57 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8004(b) (McKinney 1981). 
58 Id.; Land v. Esrig, 43 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (Sup. Ct. 1943). 
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purposes of complying with the New York Multiple Dwelling 
Law and New York City Housing Maintenance Code.59 Once 
appointed, the “receiver is charged with the responsibility to 
‘preserve and protect the property for the benefit of all persons 
interested in the estate.’”60 State law further directs courts in 
New York City to include in their appointing orders that the 
receiver will give priority to remedying housing code 
violations.61 
Ordinarily, the receivership’s expenditures are limited to the 
money it takes in from the property.62 In many cases, this will 
not be sufficient to pay for anything beyond basic taxes, fees, 
and charges (e.g., for water and heating oil).63 When there is a 
                                                          
59 N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(44) (McKinney 2001); N.Y.C. 
CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2004(45), 27-2005 (N.Y. Legal 
Publishing Corp. 1993).  
60 Bank of Tokyo Trust Co. v. Urban Food Malls Ltd., 650 N.Y.S.2d 
654, 665 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting Jamaica Sav. Bank v. Florizal Realty 
Corp., 407 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1018 (Sup. Ct. 1978)). “The legal responsibility 
of a receiver to maintain the receivership property in good repair is settled 
law.” 79 N.Y. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 862 (2003) (citing Griffo v. Swartz, 306 
N.Y.S.2d 64, 75 (Cnty. Ct. 1969)). “A receiver in a foreclosure action . . . 
stands in the shoes of the owner, and has a legal duty to maintain the 
property in good repair and is liable for damages for the failure to meet that 
duty.” Mercedes v. Menella, 827 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (App. Div. 2006) (citing 
Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32–22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 
(App. Div. 1997)). 
61 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325(3) (McKinney 2009) (“In a city 
with a population of one million or more persons an order appointing a 
receiver to receive the rents and profits of a multiple dwelling shall provide 
that the receiver . . . expend rents and income and profits as described in 
subdivision two of this section, except that a priority shall be given to the 
correction of immediately hazardous and hazardous violations of housing 
maintenance laws within the time set by orders of any municipal department, 
or, if not practicable, seek a postponement of the time for compliance.”); see 
also Memorandum of the City of New York, in 1983 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 303 
(“[T]enants . . . many times face dangerous health and safety situations. This 
bill would afford court appointed receivers with proper guidance during the 
mortgage foreclosure period.”). 
62 Herz et al., supra note 26, at 35. The receiver may also enter into 
lease agreements for the premises and take out necessary loans, subject to 
court approval. Id. at 37–38. 
63 See, e.g., City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 14. 
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deficit, the receiver will look to the foreclosing mortgagee, who 
is probably the receiver’s only source of additional funds.64 State 
law permits the mortgagee to advance funds to the receiver of a 
multiple dwelling65 in order to correct violations, but it does not 
explicitly require it to do so.66 Mortgagees typically attempt to 
recoup these advances as part of the ultimate recovery from the 
mortgagor.67 Where the need goes beyond the building’s income 
and any advances, this statutory scheme falls short of meeting 
the receiver’s obligations to innocent tenants.68 
III. CURRENT LAW INADEQUATELY PROTECTS THE INNOCENT 
VICTIMS OF FORECLOSURE 
The United States faces an unprecedented crisis in the rate of 
defaults on mortgages. By the end of the current crisis, between 
8 and 13 million homes will have been foreclosed on, according 
to some predictions.69 Millions more borrowers are 
“underwater,” owing more on their mortgages than their real 
estate is worth, and are in danger of foreclosure if they fall 
                                                          
64 Herz et al., supra note 26, at 35. 
65 N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(7) (McKinney 2001) (“[A] multiple 
dwelling . . . [is] . . . a dwelling which is either rented, leased, let or hired 
out, to be occupied, or is occupied as the residence or home of three or more 
families living independently of each other.”). 
66 MULT. DWELL. § 302-b(1) (“[W]here a receiver has been appointed in 
foreclosure proceedings instituted by a mortgagee with respect to any multiple 
dwelling, such mortgagee may advance to such receiver funds necessary for 
the operation of such multiple dwelling and for the making of repairs therein 
necessary to remove conditions constituting violations of this chapter.” 
(emphasis added)). 
67 Herz et al., supra note 26, at 35 (“Most mortgage documents do allow 
the lender to spend money to protect its collateral, and then recover those 
expenses from the borrower as part of the borrower’s secured obligation.”). 
68 But see Litho Fund Equities, Inc. v. Alley Spring Apartments Corp., 
462 N.Y.S.2d 907, 909 (App. Div. 1983) (holding that the court may 
consider “whether there [a]re special circumstances that make it equitable to 
impose additional receivership expenses on [the mortgagee] even though the 
expenses exceed the rent collected”). 
69 Vicki Been et al., Decoding the Foreclosure Crisis: Causes, 
Responses, and Consequences, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 388, 388 
(2011). 
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behind on payments.70 The end does not appear to be in sight.71 
As recently as August 2011, the number of new mortgage 
foreclosure filings jumped significantly, and as of March 2012, 
observers are noting a troubling new trend in foreclosure 
activity.72 Nor is the crisis limited to places like Florida, 
California, Texas, and Arizona, where the bursting housing 
bubble left neighborhoods dotted with empty “McMansions” and 
dying lawns.73 New York City, despite having a relatively stable 
housing supply, suffered a massive price bubble74 and has seen a 
rapid increase in foreclosure filings.75 And it is not just 
homeowners who are suffering: experts estimate that more than 
20% of the properties in foreclosure nationwide are rentals,76 
                                                          
70 Editorial, On the Road to Relief, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/opinion/on-the-road-to-mortgage-
relief.html (“Currently, some 14.5 million borrowers are underwater, on 
average, by $50,000.”). 
71 Ann Carrns, Foreclosure Crisis Isn’t Even Halfway Over, Analysis 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2011), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11 
/30/foreclosure-crisis-isnt-even-halfway-over-analysis-finds/. 
72 The Foreclosure Report–August 2011, FORECLOSURE RADAR, 
http://www.foreclosureradar.com/foreclosure-report/foreclosure-report-
august-2011 (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (attributing jump to filings by Bank 
of America); Matthew Yglesias, Foreclosure Fraud Settlement Filing Leads to 
Spike in Foreclosure Activity, SLATE (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/moneybox/2012/03/15/foreclosure_fraud_settlement_filing_leads_to_spi
ke_in_foreclosure_activity.html. 
73 See June Fletcher, The McMansion Glut, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 
2006), http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB115042445578782114-lMyQjAx 
MDE2N TEwNjQxMjY0Wj.html (“McMansions . . . [are] . . . oversized 
homes—characterized by sprawling layouts on small lots, and built in cookie-
cutter style by big developers.”). 
74 See Edward L. Glaeser et al., Housing Supply and Housing Bubbles 
28 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research Discussion, Paper No. 2158, 2008) 
(“[M]arkets with highly elastic supply sides are much less likely to have 
‘bubbles.’”). 
75 Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Erik Martin Dilan, 
Chairperson, Comm. on Hous. & Bldgs. of N.Y.C. Council) (“According to 
a report published last month by the New York State Co[mp]troller’s Office, 
between the years 2006 and 2009, the number of foreclosure filings within 
the City of New York rose approximately 32%, to 22,866.”). 
76 Aleatra P. Williams, Real Estate Market Meltdown, Foreclosures and 
Tenants’ Rights, 43 IND. L. REV. 1185, 1185 n.1 (2010) (citing JOINT CTR. 
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and in New York City, more than half the families affected by 
foreclosures are renters.77 
Tenants of buildings in foreclosure face special challenges. 
In addition to evictions without cause, foreclosures often lead to 
a substantial increase in housing code or warranty of habitability 
violations.78 Absentee owners may simply abscond with tenants’ 
rent payments without investing in any building upkeep.79 The 
problem is especially acute in low-income neighborhoods and 
communities of color.80 
Predatory lending has exacerbated the problem of troubled 
mortgages81 and has caused many properties to go underwater.82 
                                                          
FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE 
KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 14 (2008)). 
77 DANILO PELLETIERE, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., RENTERS IN 
FORECLOSURE: DEFINING THE PROBLEM, IDENTIFYING THE SOLUTIONS 2 
(2009), available at http://www.nlihc.org/doc/renters-in-foreclosure.pdf (“In 
New York City, the Furman Center conservatively estimated that if an owner 
lived on-site in every multi-unit building and none of the single-family 
residences in foreclosures were rentals, 50% of the nearly 30,000 families 
affected by foreclosure were renters.”) (citing Press Release, Furman Ctr. for 
Real Estate & Urban Policy, New Analysis of NYC Foreclosure Data 
Reveals 15,000 Renter Households Living in Buildings that Entered 
Foreclosure in 2007 (Apr. 14, 2008), available at http://furmancenter.org/ 
files/FurmanRelease_RentersinFore closure_7_14_ 2008.pdf). 
78 VICKI BEEN ET AL., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN 
POLICY, STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING & NEIGHBORHOODS 2010, at 
5–6 [hereinafter STATE OF N.Y.C. HOUSING REPORT] (“The analysis finds 
that buildings receive an average of 21 percent more violations during the 
specific quarter in which a lis pendens is filed, and 15 percent more 
violations during the two quarters prior to the lis pendens issuance and the 
two quarters after, compared to what the building received in other 
periods.”). 
79 See Bob Hennelly, What Happens When No One Wants to Own a 
Place, WNYC (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/ 
2011/aug/15/ what-happens-when-no-one-wants-own-place/. 
80 Justin P. Steil, Innovative Responses to Foreclosures: Paths to 
Neighborhood Stability and Housing Opportunity, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 
63, 76–86 (2011); Catherine Dunn, Foreclosure Crisis Fades to Black and 
Brown, CITY LIMITS MAG. (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.citylimits.org/news/ 
articles/4363/foreclosure-crisis-fades-to-black-and-brown. 
81 See Christopher J. Mayer & R. Glenn Hubbard, House Prices, Interest 
Rates, and the Mortgage Market Meltdown 7–8 (2008) (unpublished 
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During the latest real estate boom, investors bought up 
properties in New York and other cities with low rent rolls, 
hoping to evict tenants paying below-market rents,83 remove 
apartments from rent regulation,84 and re-rent units at market 
rate.85 Many such plans were based on unrealistic expectations.86 
                                                          
manuscript), http://www.nber.org/public_html/confer/2008/cff08/mayer.pdf 
(attributing worst of crisis to overleveraging real estate values). 
82 Yuliya S. Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1848, 1872 (2011) 
(“[L]enders were to some extent aware of high [loan-to-value] ratios being 
increasingly associated with risky borrowers.”); Angela Maddaloni & José-
Luis Peydró, Bank Risk-taking, Securitization, Supervision, and Low Interest 
Rates, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2121, 2124 (2011). 
83 “[S]enior citizens, long term tenants, and the disabled. . . . [A]re often 
singled out by landlords for eviction because they often have been in the 
apartment for many years and thus pay lower rents.” Jambes v. Veale, 504 
N.Y.S.2d 982, 986 (Civ. Ct. 1986) (quoting Budhu v. Grasso, 479 N.Y.S.2d 
303, 306 (Civ. Ct. 1984) (quoting Memorandum of Assemblyman Richard N. 
Gottfried. in 1984 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 109 (supporting revisions to N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.4 (2000) (Rent Stabilization 
Code)))).  
84 State law allows an owner to remove a vacant apartment from rent 
stabilization by spending forty times the difference between the legal 
regulated monthly rent and $2,500 (but the owner must spend sixty times the 
difference in rent in a building with more than 35 apartments). Fact Sheet 
#12 – Rent Increases for Individual Apartment Improvements (IAI), N.Y. 
STATE HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, http://nysdhcr.gov/Rent/FactSheets/ 
orafac12.htm (last updated July 31, 2011); see also Fact Sheet #36 – High-
Rent Vacancy Deregulation and High-Rent High-Income Deregulation, N.Y. 
STATE HOMES & CMTY. RENEWAL, http://nysdhcr.gov/Rent/FactSheets/ 
orafac36.htm (last updated July 2011). 
85 ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., PREDATORY EQUITY: 
EVOLUTION OF A CRISIS 4 (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.anhd.org/ 
resources/Predatory_Equity-Evolution_of_a_Crisis_Report.pdf (finding that 
predatory equity loans “could place up to 100,000 apartments at risk”); see 
also Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 2 (“The 
predatory equity model leads inevitably to widespread defaults that undermine 
the financial system while causing displacement of low income families.”). 
86 See, e.g., Terry Pristin, Tenants Fret Over Big Debt at a Top Address, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/ 
realestate/commercial/tenants-anxious-over-next-move-at-a-manhattan-
landmark.html (“[T]he Belnord loan was based on unrealistic expectations 
about how quickly rent-regulated apartments would become vacant.”). 
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Regulated apartments have not become vacant as often, nor have 
rents increased as much, as owners had hoped.87 Much of the 
financing made available to real estate investors who bought 
rental buildings now appears inappropriately outsized because 
lenders did not account for realistic rental income, costs of 
repairs, heating oil or gas, and other necessary expenses on top 
of the debt service payments, while at the same time, real estate 
prices and equity have collapsed.88 Consequently, some owners 
have purposefully withheld repairs to coerce tenants to vacate 
their apartments, in order to improve their bottom line.89 
Repairs are of less concern, however, if tenants also face 
eviction proceedings because of the foreclosure, but they are 
crucial for long-term tenants with an interest in staying put.90 In 
New York City, many tenants are entitled to renewal leases 
under the Rent Stabilization Code,91 or continued tenancy under 
the Rent Control Law,92 the benefits of which they may no 
longer have if forced to move.93 Outside New York City, similar 
                                                          
87 City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 15. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 10 (describing rationale behind Tenant Harassment Act); E-mail 
from Shira Galinsky, Staff Att’y, S. Brooklyn Legal Servs., to author (Oct. 
20, 2011, 02:15 PM EST) (on file with author) (“[W]ithholding repairs is a 
very popular method of enhancing turnover.” (quoting Posting of Jonathan 
Levy, Deputy Dir., Hous. Unit, Legal Servs. N.Y.C.–Bronx, Jlevy@bx.ls-
nyc.org, to N.Y.C. Hous. Discussion, HousingNYC@wnylc.net (Sept. 15, 
2011, 2:29 P.M.))). 
90 But see Minjak Co. v. Randolph, 528 N.Y.S.2d 554 (App. Div. 1988) 
(holding that abandonment due to uninhabitable conditions may absolve the 
tenant from paying rent). 
91 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2524.1 (2000) (provision 
of the Rent Stabilization Code prohibiting eviction). 
92 See id. § 2104.1 (provision of the Rent Control Law prohibiting 
eviction). 
93 Raun J. Rasmussen, Defending Rent-Controlled Tenants Against 
Eviction, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 8, 1992, at 3 (“Unfortunately for tenants in New 
York City, many banks fail to investigate the rent regulatory status of the 
tenants who occupy the building upon which they have foreclosed, and bring 
meritless motions for writs of assistance. Tenants are confused by the legal 
papers, confused by the forum, and unable to get legal assistance if they are 
low income. They therefore fail to appear, fail to assert valid defenses, and 
end up evicted and homeless.”); Rasmussen, supra note 16. 
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laws apply in a handful of jurisdictions.94 In other states, such as 
Massachusetts,95 and in thirteen jurisdictions in California,96 
tenants at foreclosure are protected from eviction without good 
cause—at least until the property is transferred to a new owner. 
In addition, current federal law allows all tenants of one-to-four 
family buildings to continue their valid leases during and after a 
foreclosure sale, up to the end of the lease term.97 Federal law also 
allows recipients of federal Section 8 Housing Choice vouchers, 
which subsidize private rentals for eligible individuals, to remain in 
their apartments after a judgment of foreclosure and sale.98  
It would thwart these laws’ purpose if uninhabitable 
conditions were to lead to constructive evictions. Affordable 
housing in expensive urban markets like New York City is also 
threatened if housing conditions deteriorate to the point where 
constructive evictions lead to tenants leaving, allowing the 
owners to remove apartments from rent regulation.99 Legislators 
at every level of government have enacted protections for paying 
tenants who, by no fault of their own, risk becoming homeless 
because of a foreclosure. As the following sections will 
demonstrate, however, those responses have not adequately 
                                                          
94 Daniel Finkelstein & Lucas A. Ferrara, [F] NEW YORK PRACTICE, 
LANDLORD AND TENANT PRACTICE IN NEW YORK § 11:1, n.1 (West 2011). 
95 Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186A, § 2 (2012) (“[A] foreclosing 
owner shall not evict a tenant except for just cause or unless a binding 
purchase and sale agreement has been executed for a bona fide third party to 
purchase the housing accommodation from a foreclosing owner.”), with An 
Act Requiring Tenant Protections in Foreclosed Properties, S.B. 1609, 186th 
Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2009) (proposing further, postsale tenant protections). 
96 Nicole Gon Ochi, The California Tenant Stability Act: A Solution for 
Renters Affected by the Foreclosure Crisis, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 51, 65 n.124 (2010) (listing California jurisdictions with “just cause”-
type eviction protection measures for tenants at foreclosure). 
97 Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
22, § 701–04, 123 Stat. 1632, 1660–62 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5220, 42 
U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. 2010)), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1484, 124 Stat. 1376, 
2204 (2010)) (clarifying and extending the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure 
Act of 2009 until December 31, 2014). 
98 § 701–04, 123 Stat. at 1660–62. 
99 See infra Part V.B.1. 
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addressed the crucial gap period between an owner’s default and 
the moment title passes to a new owner. 
A. Federal Statutory Response 
Recognizing the plight of tenants at foreclosure, Congress 
passed the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 
(PTFA).100 The PTFA applies to one-to-four family dwellings 
and provides that, in the case of a foreclosure, any new owner 
takes title subject to the tenants’ bona fide leasehold interests; 
but if the lease expires, or if the new owner intends to occupy 
the premises as a primary residence, then the tenant is entitled to 
ninety days notice before any eviction.101 The PTFA further 
protects tenants in any size building who receive federal Section 
8 Housing Choice Voucher subsidies.102 Although the PTFA 
adds important protections against immediate eviction, it does 
not address the plight of tenants facing uninhabitable conditions 
during and after the foreclosure process, which may take years 
to unfold.103 Moreover, the PTFA sunsets in 2014.104 Because the 
PTFA only applies to buildings “designed principally for the 
occupancy of from one to four families,” it would have only 
applied to Milbank’s tenants who received Section 8 vouchers, 
and not to the buildings generally.105 The PTFA is an important 
                                                          
100 § 701–04, 123 Stat. at 1660–62. 
101 Id. The PTFA applies to foreclosures of “federally-related mortgage 
loans,” a wide category that includes any loan for a one-to-four family 
dwelling made by a bank whose deposits are insured by FDIC. 12 
U.S.C. § 2602 (2006). 
102 § 701–04, 123 Stat. at 1660–62. 
103 Elan Stavros Nichols, Unanswered Questions Under the PTFA: 
Exploring the Extent of Tenant Protections in Foreclosed Properties, 20 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 153, 165–66 n.90 (2011) 
(citing Creola Johnson, Renters Evicted en Masse: Collateral Damage Arising 
from the Subprime Foreclosure Crisis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 975, 977, 990 (2010)). 
104 § 701–04, 123 Stat. 1632. 
105 12 U.S.C. § 2602 (2006). Section 8 voucher recipients are already 
protected by federal regulations that require owners to meet certain housing 
quality standards. Housing Quality Standards, 24 C.F.R. § 982.401 (2011); 
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., NO. 7420.10G, HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER 
PROGRAM GUIDEBOOK 10-1 (2001), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/ 
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step, but it is a temporary measure that does not address 
habitable conditions for tenants at foreclosure. 
B. State Statutory Responses 
Similarly, New York law provides additional protections but 
still leaves substantial gaps. In 2009, Governor David Paterson 
signed into law Senate Bill S66007,106 which revised New York 
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) section 
1307 to require plaintiffs in foreclosure actions (usually 
mortgage lenders) who obtain judgments of foreclosure to 
maintain the foreclosed properties during the period between 
judgment and sale.107  
Unfortunately, however, the statute is silent with respect to 
the crucial period from the mortgagor’s default to judgment, 
when the building may be in the hands of a court-appointed 
receiver.108 This period could span several years. The bill as 
written purports to “relieve[] the plaintiff [i.e., the mortgagee] 
of the responsibility to maintain the property for the period that 
a receiver of such property is serving,” but it also purports to 
not “diminish any obligations of the mortgagor or receiver to 
maintain the property prior to the closing of the title and [to] not 
diminish or reduce the rights of the parties under existing law 
against the mortgagor of the property for failure to maintain 
                                                          
adm/hudclips/guidebooks/7420.10G/7420g10GUID.pdf. 
106 Senator Klein Joins Governor Paterson in Signing into Law Landmark 
Foreclosure Legislation, N.Y. ST. SENATE, http://www.nysenate.gov/video/ 
2009/dec/15/senator-klein-joins-governor-paterson-signing-law-landmark-
foreclosure-legislation (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
107 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 2009). But see 
Daniel Beekman, Bank-owned Bronx Buildings ‘Ticking Time Bombs’; Wells 
Fargo and Deutsche Ignore Building Codes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 2, 
2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-08-02/local/29859994_1_domingo- 
cedano-deutsche-bank-buildings-department (suggesting banks are ignoring 
section 1307’s mandate); Aarti Shahani, With Banks As Landlords, Some 
Tenants Neglected, NPR (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/23/ 
147160871/with-banks-as-landlords-some-tenants-neglected (documenting 
similar cases in California and Maryland). 
108 See REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307. 
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such property.”109 Uncertainty about the ability of mortgagees to 
enter and control the premises during the foreclosure 
proceeding, when the mortgagor technically retains ownership, 
would perhaps explain why the legislature declined to extend 
these obligations to mortgagees during the foreclosure action.110 
In a multiple dwelling foreclosure, however, courts often 
appoint a receiver, who steps into the shoes of the owner and 
assumes the duty to maintain the building, but who often lacks 
the funds to do so.111 
Not only does it neglect to address this significant gap in 
time during which tenants are particularly vulnerable, but 
RPAPL section 1307 also fails to achieve its stated goals. If its 
purpose is to protect tenants during foreclosure, but the 
mortgagor cannot afford to make payments on its mortgage, it is 
likely that the mortgagor cannot afford to pay for upkeep needed 
to protect those tenants. Many tenants may be constructively 
evicted long before a judgment is entered. Moreover, if a 
building deteriorates during the foreclosure action, it may cost 
the mortgagee more to fulfill its duties under RPAPL section 
1307—maintaining the property from judgment to sale—than it 
would have if the mortgagee had begun making repairs as soon 
as a receiver stepped in.112 Finally, there is evidence that 
foreclosing banks are simply ignoring section 1307’s mandate.113 
                                                          
109 S.B. 7V § 6, 232 Leg., Spec. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); see also infra Part 
V. 
110 See Hearings, supra note 1, 80–81 (testimony of Michael P. Smith, 
President & C.E.O., N.Y. Bankers Ass’n). 
111 See supra Part II. 
112 See D.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, No. 
680931, STUDY GUIDE FOR PROPERTY MANAGERS EXAMINATION 16 (2011), 
available at http://www.asisvcs.com/publications/pdf/680931.pdf (“Often, by 
‘investing’ in preventive maintenance, the owner will save money by avoiding 
costly emergency repairs.”). For example, reroofing an apartment building to 
halt leaks may be expensive, but it may be much less expensive to take this 
preventive step than to wait until the building also requires extensive mold 
remediation resulting from water leaks. See Bill Boles, Missteps with Mold, 
HOME ENERGY, July/Aug. 2002, at 38, 40, available at http://www.bestof 
buildingscience.com/pdf/Missteps%20with%20Mold%20HEM_19-4_p38-
41.pdf. 
113 Beekman, supra note 107. 
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Another, older New York law contemplates a possible 
community-based approach to abandonment. Article 7A of the 
RPAPL “provides for the appointment by housing court judges 
of private administrators to manage residential buildings that 
have been ‘effectively abandoned’ by their owners, and in which 
conditions are ‘dangerous to life, health, or safety’ of tenants.”114 
A third or more of a building’s tenants can petition for an 
administrator.115 The process can be contentious, lengthy, and 
time-consuming,116 however, and it can be difficult for tenants to 
agree on strategy and to find competent people willing to serve 
as administrators.117 As a result, Article 7A–administered 
buildings remain relatively rare.118 
Outside New York, similar statutes offer some protection for 
tenants at foreclosure.119 Massachusetts law is particularly tenant 
friendly: new owners who obtain title in a foreclosure sale may 
not evict existing tenants without just cause.120 Other states have 
yet to enact “just cause” measures, but are making limited 
progress on other fronts.121 In Texas, for example, although its 
state laws are even less protective of tenants at foreclosure than 
the PTFA, the legislature recently passed two measures aimed at 
helping renters of properties in foreclosure:122 (1) Texas Justice 
Courts may now issue orders restoring utility services to renters, 
                                                          
114 HON. G. OLIVER KOPPELL & MOLLY WASOW PARK, N.Y.C. INDEP. 
BUDGET OFFICE, REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING PRESERVATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT’S ARTICLE 7A PROGRAM 1 (2003) (quoting N.Y. REAL 
PROP. ACTS. LAW art. 7A (McKinney 2009)), available at http://www.ibo. 
nyc.ny.us/ iboreports/7amemo.pdf. 
115 Id. 
116 For example, the proceeding may first be adjourned several times to 
allow the owner to attempt to remedy the conditions. See In re Dep’t of 
Hous. & Pres. Dev., N.Y. L.J., Oct. 1, 1992, at 21. 
117 Rasmussen, supra note 22. 
118 See KOPPELL & PARK, supra note 114 (finding 123 buildings under 
7A administration as of 2003). 
119 WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 33, at 8. 
120 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
121 WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, supra note 33, at 8. 
122 Elizabeth M. Bruman, Legislative Changes Impacting the Residential 
Landlord Tenant Relationship in Texas, HOUS. LAW., Jan./Feb. 2010, at 38, 
39–40. 
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a frequent issue for tenants at foreclosure, and (2) courts may 
also order repairs costing up to $10,000.123 It is unclear, 
however, whether repair orders would be enforceable against 
anyone but the owner, such as the mortgagee. Like New York, 
other states have sidestepped the messy issue of who is 
responsible for repairs during the foreclosure proceeding and 
have done little to protect innocent tenants from constructive 
eviction. 
C. Local Administrative Responses 
Direct government intervention may also protect tenants 
from hazardous code violations.124 Where an absent or negligent 
owner fails to correct serious violations of the Housing 
Maintenance Code, the New York City Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development (HPD) may step in to make 
repairs and restore essential services.125 The agency then bills the 
owner or places a tax lien on the property to recoup the amounts 
expended.126 Additionally, New York City’s Safe Housing Act127 
created an Alternative Enforcement Program to target the city’s 
worst 200 buildings with more focused efforts.128 But only the 
most serious cases receive agency attention, government action 
may be long in coming, and the remedial measures may be 
merely a stopgap.129 Moreover, the expense of HPD’s emergency 
                                                          
123 Id. at 40. 
124 See N.Y.C. CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2125, 27-2128 
(N.Y. Legal Publishing Corp. 1993). Section 27-2005 of the Administrative 
Code mandates compliance with New York City’s Housing Maintenance 
Code. New York State’s warranty of habitability is codified at N.Y. REAL 
PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 2006). 
125 Rasmussen, supra note 16 (“Tenants can get help with some 
emergencies, such as cascading water leaks and empty boilers, from 
[HPD].”). 
126 N.Y.C. CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2125, 27-2128 (N.Y. 
Legal Publishing Corp. 1993); City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 
7. 
127 N.Y.C., N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 29, Int. No. 561-A (2007); City 
Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 8. 
128 City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 8–9. 
129 Rasmussen, supra note 16 (“[F]or conditions that the city considers 
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repairs are an unnecessary burden on the city budget where a 
lender has filed a foreclosure action to recover its security for a 
mortgage loan and sought a receiver to protect the value of that 
security.130 These remedies fill a necessary role, but they should 
be a last resort. 
D. Private Ordering 
When faced with uninhabitable conditions, tenants may also 
employ self-help.131 For example, tenants may band together or 
solicit charity in order to pay heating bills when an owner fails 
to supply heat in the dead of winter.132 Two principal problems 
with this approach are the inability of poor tenants to pay for 
self-help, and the uncertain recoupment of expenses, especially 
where the owner has “walked away” from the property.133 
Increasingly, community-based organizations are getting 
involved, sometimes to purchase distressed properties in order to 
turn them into permanent affordable housing.134 Although 
                                                          
less dangerous, e.g., broken windows, leaky ceilings, mold or rat infestation, 
tenants may have no recourse but self help.”). 
130 See City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 7–8 (noting 
burden). Many of the same cities that face foreclosure crises also face budget 
shortfalls and have precious few staff devoted to maintaining the quality of 
private property for renters. See Roger Lowenstein, Broke Town U.S.A., 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/ 
magazine/06Muni-t.html (describing cuts to local government services). 
131 Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 588, 
589 (App. Div. 1997) (“The tenants . . . claimed to have expended more 
than $50,000 of their own money in repairs to the building . . . .”); 
Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart v. Meer, 517 N.Y.S.2d 504, 508 
(App. Div. 1987) (“[A] tenant may take it upon himself to incur an expense 
for a repair or service which the landlord is obligated to provide, and he may 
sue to recover the cost . . . .”). 
132 See Rasmussen, supra note 22. 
133 See id. 
134 JOSIAH MADAR ET AL., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN 
POLICY, TRANSFORMING FORECLOSED PROPERTIES INTO COMMUNITY ASSETS 
3 (2009), available at http://furmancenter.org/files/FurmanCenterWhite 
Paper_TransformingForeclosedPropertiesIntoCommunityAssets.pdf; Nicholas 
Hartigan, No One Leaves: Community Mobilization as a Response to the 
Foreclosure Crisis in Massachusetts, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 181, 202–
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advocates are cautiously optimistic that this mechanism will gain 
traction and spread, it is still relatively rare.135 Moreover, the 
process may simply take too long to make this an appropriate 
remedy for urgently needed repairs.136 
Finally, tenants in these situations have a cause of action 
against the current owners, which they may bring before the 
foreclosure court or in a separate action.137 In New York City, 
state law allows a special part of the Housing Court to hear 
petitions (called “HP actions”) by tenants against owners who 
fail to comply with the Housing Maintenance Code.138 Initiating 
an HP action in Housing Court is fairly simple: claimants fill 
out a preprinted form and pay a small fee.139 In contrast, in a 
foreclosure action involving a receiver, tenants cannot sue the 
                                                          
03 (2010); James J. Kelly, Jr., Refreshing the Heart of the City: Vacant 
Building Receivership as a Tool for Neighborhood Revitalization and 
Community Empowerment, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. 
L. 210, 210 (2004). 
135 See Hartigan, supra note 134, at 200–03. Examples of such 
organizations in New York City include the Fifth Avenue Committee and the 
Pratt Area Community Council. See Affordable Housing, FIFTH AVE. 
COMM., http://www.fifthave.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&page 
ID=610&nodeID=54 (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) (“FAC has built or 
renovated 600 units of affordable housing for low and moderate- income 
residents since 1978 and we currently have nearly 400 units in 
development.”); Housing Development, PRATT AREA CMTY. COUNCIL, 
http://pacc.publishpath.com/housing-develop ment (last visited Nov. 19, 
2011) (“Since 1988, PACC has developed more than 600 units of housing in 
more than 65 buildings . . . .”). By contrast, the New York City Housing 
Authority administers 178,882 units of public housing. Fact Sheet, N.Y.C. 
HOUS. AUTH., http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/html/about/fact sheet.shtml 
(last updated Mar. 18, 2011). 
136 MADAR ET AL., supra note 134, at 6, 12, 21, 22, 34 (noting delay, as 
well as organizational and financial hurdles to closing deals). But see id. at 
32 (documenting one case where length of time property remained abandoned 
was shorter than through the regular foreclosure process). 
137 Rasmussen, supra note 22. 
138 Hon. Robert F. Dolan, 3 RASCH’S NEW YORK LANDLORD & TENANT 
INCLUDING SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS § 40:4 (4th ed. 2011). 
139 ASS’N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C. HOUSING COURT PUB. SERV. PROJECTS 
COMM. & CIVIL COURT OF N.Y.C., FERN A. FISHER, ADMIN. JUDGE, A 
TENANT’S GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING COURT 19 (2006), 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/tenantsguide.pdf. 
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receiver without leave of the appointing court.140 Thus, they are 
forced to make a motion in State Supreme Court, which might 
entail hiring an attorney familiar with both landlord-tenant and 
foreclosure law.141 This is a far more complicated task than 
beginning an HP action.142 Additionally, the New York City Tenant 
Harassment Law143 makes it illegal for landlords to intentionally 
harass tenants, which includes disrupting essential services or 
neglecting to make repairs.144 But the owner who can no longer 
keep up with his or her mortgage payments may not even show up 
when sued, and the tenant plaintiff may be left with a useless 
judgment, unable to collect.145 In either case, a lawsuit (or the 
threat of one) would probably result in a negotiated settlement, but 
would likely only protect the tenants if that threat were credible. In 
sum, currently available remedies are inadequate for tenants of 
buildings in foreclosure who urgently need repairs. 
IV. HOUSING ADVOCATES IN NEW YORK CITY EXTEND AN 
EQUITABLE REMEDY 
Tenant advocates have attempted to use existing statutory and 
case law to protect the vulnerable, but sometimes advocates must 
                                                          
140 Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 (1881); Kilarjian v. Kilarjian, 
299 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751–52 (App. Div. 1969). But see Madison III Assocs. 
v. Brock, 685 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (App. Div. 1999) (“[T]his Court has 
discouraged resort to Supreme Court where complete relief can be accorded 
by the Housing Part of the Civil Court.”). 
141 See Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 4 (“Mr. Del Valle [counsel 
for the receiver]: . . . he [a contractor] had brought a motion down there [in 
Civil Court] asking for permission [to sue the receiver], but the Court said 
you have to come up to the Supreme Court. He didn’t understand. It’s a pro 
se litigant, your Honor.”). 
142 See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Bank v. Browne, No. 27151/08 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Kings Cnty. Oct. 5, 2009) (denying a motion similar to that granted in 
Milbank, but authorizing the tenants to bring an HP action in Housing 
Court). 
143 N.Y.C., N.Y., LOCAL LAW NO. 7 INT. NO. 627-A (2008). 
144 City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 10. 
145 Rasmussen, supra note 16 (“[M]any landlords in foreclosure simply 
won’t show up; a default judgment does little to get repairs completed.”); 
Rasmussen, supra note 22. 
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push the envelope. In 1996, before the enactment of RPAPL 
section 1307, a New York trial court ordered a foreclosing bank 
to make repairs to a long-neglected property.146 The bank had 
already won a judgment, but it had allowed twenty-nine months to 
elapse before requesting a sale.147 Meanwhile, the tenants suffered 
without heat or hot water and with other dangerous conditions.148 
Significantly, the bank had become the legal owner of the 
premises, and therefore compelling it to maintain the premises 
was novel but relatively straightforward.149 State law now codifies 
such a duty, but it would take twelve years after this action for 
the legislature to pass this provision into law.150 Even after 
RPAPL section 1307’s enactment, tenants still often face poor 
housing conditions during and after foreclosure proceedings.151 
This is illustrative of a broader problem: statutory and court-made 
law have not brought relief for tenants in certain circumstances. 
Faced with few viable options, tenant advocates have turned to 
making equitable arguments before foreclosure courts.152 This Part 
summarizes the facts in Milbank and the equitable rule that the 
court applied. 
A. The Facts of Milbank 
As foreclosure filings have increased during the financial 
crisis and overwhelmed court dockets, for some tenants, the gap 
period that RPAPL section 1307 leaves open has become 
                                                          
146 Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev. v. Greenpoint Sav. Bank, 646 N.Y.S.2d 
601, 604 (Civ. Ct. 1995); see also Rasmussen, supra note 22. N.Y. REAL 
PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 2009). 
147 Greenpoint Sav. Bank, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 691. 
148 Id. at 604. 
149 Id.  
150 REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1307. 
151 See Beekman, supra note 107 (suggesting banks are ignoring section 
1307’s mandate); Shahani, supra note 107. 
152 See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Dec. 20, 2011) (granting motion similar to that 
in Milbank); N.Y. Cmty. Bank v. 1255 Longfellow LLC, No. 306660/10 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Aug. 12, 2010) (filing with similar motion 
pending). 
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interminable. In a recent case in New York Supreme Court for 
Bronx County, a mortgagee sought to foreclose on ten large 
apartment buildings.153 With some 4,300 housing code violations, 
the buildings were in terrible shape.154 A quarter of the 548 units 
were vacant and uninhabitable, but the rest had tenants, who 
suffered through conditions ranging from intermittent heat and 
hot water to leaks and mold.155 On the tenants’ motion, the 
Supreme Court ordered the mortgagee to advance $2.5 million 
to the receiver, enough to correct the immediately hazardous 
conditions.156  
In November 2006, Los Angeles–based Milbank Real Estate 
Services began investing in its Bronx portfolio, financing the 
purchase of ten apartment buildings with a $35 million loan 
from Deutsche Bank.157 The bank repackaged the mortgage into 
a $3 billion mortgage-backed securities trust named “COMM-
2006-C8,” (“the Comm trust”) which, in turn, was sold to 
investors.158 When Milbank’s investment soured, it stopped 
paying its mortgage, and the Comm trust began a foreclosure 
action,159 creating a special-purpose limited-liability company to 
serve as plaintiff.160 It named as defendants the Milbank group’s 
five LLCs, in which Milbank had placed title to the Bronx 
properties, two personal guarantors, several NYC agencies that 
might have had liens on the properties, and twenty-five John 
                                                          
153 Milbank, No. 380454/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Sept. 29, 
2010). 
154 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 11. 
155 Id. at 12. 
156 Milbank, No. 380454/09 (granting motion “for reasons stated on the 
record”); Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 20.  
157 Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1; Affidavit 
of Whitney Wheeler in Opposition to Order to Show Cause at paras. 7–14, 
Milbank, No. 380454/09 [hereinafter Wheeler Affidavit]. 
158 Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1; Wheeler 
Affidavit, supra note 157, at paras. 7–14. For background on mortgage 
securitization, see GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, FINANCE 
AND DEVELOPMENT 177–80 (6th ed. 2009). 
159 Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1. 
160 Supplemental Affidavit of Whitney Wheeler in Opposition to Order to 
Show Cause at para. 3, Milbank, No. 380454/09 [hereinafter Wheeler 
Supplemental Affidavit]. 
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Does.161 The plaintiff sought a receiver, and the court appointed 
Consolato Cicciu (“the receiver”) in March 2009.162 
The receiver complained that he did not have anywhere near 
the funds he needed to comply with the appointment order, which 
required him to maintain the premises and to correct “hazardous 
and immediately hazardous violations”163 of the Housing 
Maintenance Code.164 Though the Comm trust opposed the 
tenants’ motion, it admitted that “the status quo is untenable.”165 
The trust pointed out that it had already advanced over $1 million 
to the receiver for repairs, as the law permitted but did not 
require it to do.166 The receiver, however, reported that he used 
the money to pay current water and heating oil bills, and that 
none of it was spent to correct violations.167 The tenants stressed 
that the equities favored an order requiring the lender to advance 
additional funds to correct hazardous conditions.168 
                                                          
161 Wheeler Affidavit, supra note 157, at paras. 7–14. The plaintiff had 
moved to dismiss against the John Doe defendants, and claimed the tenants 
lacked standing to bring their motion, but the court had reserved decision on 
the motion to dismiss against the John Doe defendants and declined to 
dismiss the tenants’ motion for lack of standing. Milbank Transcript, supra 
note 3, at 14, 16. 
162 Amended Affidavit of Cicciu, supra note 8, at para. 2. 
163 This tracks the language of N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325 
(McKinney 2009). “Hazardous” and “Immediately Hazardous,” further 
correspond to “B” and “C” violations, definitions of which are promulgated 
by local authorities. HPD Online Glossary, HPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
hpd/ html/pr/hpd-online-glossary.shtml (last visited Nov. 20, 2011) (“The 
law establishes three classes of violations which are: ‘A’, non-hazardous; ‘B’, 
hazardous; or ‘C’, immediately hazardous.”). 
164 Amended Affidavit of Cicciu, supra note 8, at paras. 8–16. 
165 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 19. 
166 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Non-Party Tenants’ 
Application for an Order Directing the Court-Appointed Receiver to Cure All 
Code Violations and to Compel Plaintiff to Advance the Funds Necessary to 
Do So at 2, Milbank, No. 380454/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Mar. 17, 
2009) [hereinafter Brief of Comm 2006-C8] (describing advancing funds to the 
receiver pursuant to N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-b(1) (McKinney 2001)). 
167 Amended Affidavit of Cicciu, supra note 8, at paras. 14–15. 
168 Tenant-Defendants’ Brief in Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition and in 
Further Support of Tenant-Defendants’ Order to Show Cause at 8–12, 
Milbank, No. 380454/09 [hereinafter Reply Brief of Tenant-Defendants]. 
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In granting the tenants’ motion, the Milbank court relied on its 
equitable power, as well as on state law (RPAPL section 1325) 
providing that a receiver’s priority is to correct housing code 
violations.169 That a foreclosure court should fashion an equitable 
remedy is not all that surprising—traditionally, foreclosures were 
actions at equity,170 and today, foreclosure courts still have the 
power to create a suitable remedy that does substantial justice 
among the parties before them, even without a statute or precedent 
to guide them.171 As far as ordering a mortgagee to advance funds 
to a receiver, one court expressed its equitable function as follows: 
“[t]he plaintiff may not be heard to object when called upon to 
meet an ordinary obligation necessarily and obviously incidental to 
the relief which he himself sought, obtained and from which he 
reaped benefits.”172 Following these guideposts, the Milbank court 
held that the statutory postjudgment recoupment procedure was not 
an exclusive remedy,173 and that an equitable remedy could exist 
alongside the statutory one, even before a judgment. 
                                                          
169 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 19 (“[It] seems to me the equity’s 
here . . . .”); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325(3)(b) (McKinney 2009); 
see also Memorandum of the City of New York, supra note 61. 
170 Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 886 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, 
J., dissenting) (“There is no undeviating principle that equity shall enforce 
the covenants of a mortgage, unmoved by an appeal ad misericordiam [to 
pity], however urgent or affecting. The development of the jurisdiction of the 
chancery is lined with historic monuments that point another course.”). 
171 See In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens, 872 N.Y.S.2d 805, 805 (App. 
Div. 2009) (reversing a holding that “would result in a disproportionately 
harsh result”); Domansky v. Berkovitch, 687 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (App. Div. 
1999) (affirming money judgment as “necessary to the accomplishment of the 
directives set forth in the order of appointment, and also serving to protect 
and preserve the [property] during the pendency of the action”); Lirosi v. 
Elkins, 453 N.Y.S.2d 718, 723 (App. Div. 1982) (“[A] court of equity is not 
precluded from fashioning a suitable remedy, although precedent is 
wanting.”); Caspert v. Anderson Apartments, 94 N.Y.S.2d 521, 525 (Sup. 
Ct. 1949) (“Equity follows the law, but not slavishly nor at all times.” 
(quoting Graf, 171 N.E. at 886) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
172 Land v. Esrig, 43 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (Sup. Ct. 1943). 
173 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 18; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8004(b) 
(McKinney 1981); see also Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 
653 N.Y.S.2d 588, 590 (App. Div. 1997); Bankers Fed. Sav. Bank F.S.B. v. 
Off W. Broadway Developers, 638 N.Y.S.2d 72 (App. Div. 1996). 
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B. The Milbank Court’s Application of a Four-Factor 
Equitable Test 
The tenants urged the court to employ a four-factor 
balancing test, drawn from several appellate and lower court 
decisions, to examine (1) the degree of necessity of the 
expenses; (2) whether there would be a benefit to the party that 
requested a receiver be appointed; (3) whether the foreclosing 
mortgage lender was aware that the building income would be 
insufficient to pay the receiver’s expenses when it asked that one 
be appointed; and (4) whether the funds would be judiciously 
expended.174 That the properties were overleveraged and 
“underwater” may also have contributed to the court’s 
analysis.175 The tenants argued that, at some level, it was the 
mortgage lender’s fault for having initially made an overly risky 
loan.176 At oral argument, the court heard details on each factor 
of the test. While the court’s reasoning and application are not 
always laid bare in the transcript, the record contains enough 
facts to support its conclusion, which the court memorialized in 
a one-page short form order.177 
1. Necessity of Expenses 
First, the court had to determine that the money the tenants 
asked the Comm trust to advance was actually needed. In 
Milbank, the repairs were surely necessary. With more than 
4,300 violations, 756 of them immediately hazardous “C” 
violations (the most serious category established by the City 
Department of Housing Preservation and Development),178 the 
                                                          
174  Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 10; see also Fourth Fed. Sav. 
Bank, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 590; Litho Fund Equities, Inc. v. Alley Spring 
Apartments Corp., 462 N.Y.S.2d 907, 909 (App. Div. 1983); First N.Y. Bank 
for Bus. v. T155 E. 34 Realty Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 990, 993 (Sup. Ct. 1993). 
175 Reply Brief of Tenant-Defendants, supra note 168, at 1–4. 
176 Id. 
177 Milbank, No. 380454/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Mar. 17, 2009) 
(granting motion “for reasons stated on the record”); Milbank Transcript, 
supra note 3, at 20. 
178 HPD Online Glossary, supra note 163 (“The law establishes three 
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ten buildings were literally falling apart.179 The roofs were 
leaking, and mold was growing.180 Despite boiler repairs that the 
plaintiff claimed were completed, the buildings had a history of 
lacking heat even after repairs were supposedly done.181 The 
court heard argument on September 29, just days before New 
York City’s “heat season” typically begins on October 1.182  
The Comm trust had already advanced more than $1 million to 
the receiver, which the trust claimed was spent repairing or 
replacing boilers and elevators and fixing gas leaks.183 But the 
receiver stated that these funds were only enough to pay water and 
fuel bills, along with the buildings’ insurance premiums and real 
estate taxes.184 The Comm trust also argued that the court should 
not interfere with the status quo because a sale was imminent, and 
that the fact that the city agency charged with correcting serious 
violations had decided to take no action suggested that the repairs 
could await this sale.185 But the court was more convinced by the 
fact that the case had already languished for eighteen months on the 
court’s calendar.186 In rejecting plaintiff’s counsel’s suggestion that 
                                                          
classes of violations which are: ‘A’, non-hazardous; ‘B’, hazardous; or ‘C’, 
immediately hazardous.”). 
179 See Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
180 Id. at 7 (“Mr. Levy [tenants’ counsel]: . . . something [on] the order 
of five million dollars would make it possible for the receiver to repair the 
roof so [that] when they go in and correct the mold in somebody’s bathroom 
it doesn’t just leak the next time it rains and the mold reoccurs.”). 
181 Reply Brief of Tenant-Defendants, supra note 168, at 7. 
182 Heat and Hot Water, HPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/ 
tenants/heat-and-hot-water.shtml (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) (describing legal 
requirement for owners to provide heat to tenants). 
183 Brief of Comm 2006-C8, supra note 166, at 2–3. 
184 Amended Affidavit of Cicciu, supra note 8, at paras. 14–16.  
185 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 15 (“Mr. Tross [plaintiff’s 
counsel]: . . . . If the properties are in such disrepair, and I’m not saying 
they’re not, they are in disrepair, but if the City felt that something urgently 
needed to be done they could take over these buildings and manage the 
buildings themselves. They have not seen fit to do it and, quite frankly, the 
reason for that is we’ve met with the City counsel, we’ve met with HPD. 
They know exactly what we’re working on and they are confident that what 
we’re working on is the correct solution here . . . .”). 
186 Id. at 17 (“The Court: . . . . [Y]ou’re suggesting [that the sale i]s 
going to happen within the week, but I heard that two weeks ago, that it was 
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the repairs were not urgently needed, the court implicitly found 
that they were necessary. 
2. Benefit to the Mortgagee 
The tenants also argued that the equities weighed in their 
favor because improving the Milbank properties would actually 
inure to the benefit of the plaintiff. They argued—and plaintiff 
did not dispute—that in particular, improvements would arrest 
the deterioration of the mortgagee’s security.187 Indeed, many of 
the units in Milbank’s buildings were uninhabitable and 
generated no income.188 Repairing the properties to a rentable 
state would likely begin to show returns quite rapidly.189 In 
addition to preserving the value of its collateral, the Comm trust 
would also benefit from avoiding fines or penalties assessed 
against the property for failure to correct violations.190 On the 
other hand, making extensive repairs may have been out-of-sync 
with Milbank’s investment strategy. Some of the units were fire-
damaged, and perhaps Milbank may have wanted to tear down 
one of the buildings and rebuild instead of repairing the fire-
damaged units (in which case repairing those units would have 
                                                          
going to happen within two weeks, and before that I heard that again and 
again and again.”). 
187 Id. at 10; see also Idan Holding Corp. v. 244 Water Realty Corp., 
154 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (“[T]he preservation of the property 
inures to the benefit of the plaintiff whether he subsequently becomes the 
purchaser at the foreclosure sale or whether he preserves it merely because 
he may receive full value therefore when the sale is held.”). 
188 Amended Affidavit of Cicciu, supra note 8, at para. 10 (“[T]he 
vacancy rate, which was 10%, upon my initial appointment, is now 
approaching 25%.”). 
189 See Jemrock Realty Co. v. Krugman, 899 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (App. 
Div. 2010), appeal dismissed, 936 N.E.2d 913 (finding owner had met 
burden of showing it was entitled to a rent increase for a rent-regulated 
apartment); see also supra note 84 (describing method for removing 
apartments from rent regulation). While deregulating an apartment would 
certainly help increase the building’s profitability, it is less likely to occur in 
The Bronx than in Manhattan, and at bottom, any rent is better than no rent. 
190 See Contempt and Penalties, N.Y.C. HOUS. COURT, http://nycourts. 
gov/courts/nyc/housing/contempt.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
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been a waste of time and money),191 but the Comm trust offered 
no such rationale. In the end, the court was more “concerned 
about the condition of the apartments where there are people 
living” and did not inquire at length into whether the $2.5 
million payment would benefit the Comm trust.192 
3. Foreseeable Deficit 
The court did, however, consider the fairness of imposing a 
new cost on a mortgagee in a foreclosure action when it might 
not have foreseen the new cost arising.193 The idea is to avoid 
undue surprise by holding a party liable for hidden defects when 
it has only a bare financial interest in the building.194 This part of 
the test examines only what the plaintiff (even if it is not the 
original lender) knew at the time it sought the receiver.195 
Finally, it focuses on the receivership and considers the futility 
of appointing a caretaker for a property who is unable to take 
care of it.196 The conditions of the Milbank properties had been 
so poor for so long that the plaintiff should have known that the 
receivership would suffer a deficit if the receiver attempted to 
comply with his statutory duties by bringing the buildings up to 
code.197 Thus, the Milbank court did not find foreseeability much 
of a hurdle in directing the payment.198 
                                                          
191 See Fact Sheet #11: Demolition, N.Y. STATE HOMES & CMTY. 
RENEWAL, http://www.dhcr.state.ny.us/Rent/FactSheets/orafac11.htm (last 
updated Nov. 30, 2008). 
192 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 12. 
193 Id. at 12–13 (“The Court: Are you consenting to th[e tenants’] 
application? Mr. Tross [plaintiff’s counsel]: No, your Honor. The Court: 
Why not? You asked for the receiver. You knew the buildings weren’t in 
great shape.”). 
194 But see LEFCOE, supra note 158, at 107 (“Buyers of commercial 
property take physical inspections seriously . . . [M]ost institutional lenders 
. . . can look to professional ‘due diligence’ service providers.”). 
195 See infra Part V.B.2. 
196 See Herz et al., supra note 26, at 33–34. 
197 Amended Affidavit of Cicciu, supra note 8, at para. 16 (“It is 
abundantly clear to all that the Buildings[’] problems cannot be addressed via 
the current rent roll.”).  
198 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 12–13, 18–19. 
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4. Judicious Expense 
Spending money to fulfill a duty under law, remediating 
immediately hazardous conditions, repairing fire damage, 
stopping cascading leaks, and supplying heat and hot water to 
poor Bronx tenants are, this Note argues, the definition of 
“judicious.”199 International law as well as many scholars and 
advocates recognize decent, quality housing as a human right.200 
In many ways, New York State and New York City law echo 
this sentiment, such as by requiring receivers to prioritize 
remediating violations of the Housing Maintenance Code.201  
Not only should the money be spent on justifiable ends, but 
the amount should also be reasonable with respect to the need. 
The tenants estimated that this work would cost about $5 
million.202 The plaintiff argued that the law did not require it to 
pay anything.203 Splitting the difference, the Milbank court 
directed the plaintiff to advance $2.5 million to the receiver, 
leaving open the possibility of directing the plaintiff to advance 
more funds later.204 In the end, $2.5 million will go a long way, 
if not to correct all the serious, open violations, then at least to 
                                                          
199 See City of New York v. 629 Ltd. P’ship, 519 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 
(Sup. Ct. 1987). 
200 Chester Hartman, The Case for a Right to Housing, in A RIGHT TO 
HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 177, 179, 187–88 n.8 
(Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 2006) (citing various sources of international law 
containing right-to-housing provisions). 
201 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325(3)(b) (McKinney 2009) 
(“[P]riority shall be given to the correction of immediately hazardous and 
hazardous violations of housing maintenance laws.”). 
202 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 7. 
203 Id. at 13. 
204 Id. at 20. The plaintiff obtained a stay from the Appellate Division, 
but the stay was later vacated on the tenants’ motion. The parties have since 
settled, and a new purchaser has agreed to make all the needed repairs. E-
mail from Ian Davie, Staff Att’y, Legal Servs. N.Y.C.–Bronx, to author 
(Sept. 6, 2011) (on file with author) (explaining that among the settlement 
terms, the Comm trust agreed to “pay heat/hot water through the winter, fix 
a crumbling retaining wall, fix an elevator . . . and perfect . . . [its] appeal 
by a certain date,” while a deal was “hashed out . . . with the new 
buyer/landlord . . . [giving the] tenants some protection.”). 
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correct the most serious violations—or, as happened here, to 
force a settlement. 
V. FORECLOSURE COURTS SHOULD EXTEND EQUITABLE 
REMEDIES FOR TENANTS 
Milbank was correctly decided, and New York foreclosure 
courts should apply its reasoning to hold foreclosing mortgagees 
accountable for conditions that threaten tenants’ safety or well-
being.205 In order to protect tenants of apartment buildings in 
foreclosure, particularly those that are not owner-occupied, 
courts should require the foreclosing mortgagee to bear the 
unmet cost of needed repairs during the foreclosure action. 
Precedent and equity provide a legal framework to support this 
rule, and public policy concerns grounded in efficiency and 
common-sense fairness undergird it. 
A. Legal Framework for Holding a Foreclosing Mortgage 
Lender Liable 
Though somewhat novel, there is a sound legal basis to hold 
the foreclosing mortgagee accountable under an equity rule, 
especially where a receiver is appointed. A receiver in a 
foreclosure action stands in the shoes of the owner, and has a 
“legal duty to maintain the property in good repair and is liable for 
damages for the failure to meet that duty.”206 Because the receiver 
is a court-appointed officer, the court can order it to comply with 
legal duties.207 State law provides for postjudgment recoupment 
                                                          
205 Tenant advocates are currently seeking to extend Milbank in order to 
provide relief to tenants in foreclosed properties who, by no fault of their 
own, suffer from a lack of repairs. See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 
5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Dec. 20, 2011) 
(granting similar motion); N.Y. Cmty. Bank v. 1255 Longfellow LLC, No. 
306660/10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Aug. 12, 2010) (filing with similar 
motion pending). 
206 Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 588 
(App. Div. 1997) (citing N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-101 (McKinney 2010)); 
see supra Part II. 
207 In re Kane, 553 N.E.2d 1005, 1007 (N.Y. 1990). 
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from the mortgagee for the receiver’s necessary expenditures, but 
it is, by its terms, not an exclusive remedy.208 But imposing liability 
on a foreclosing mortgagee who is not yet an owner is doctrinally 
problematic.209 Because the warranty of habitability and other duties 
apply only to an “owner,” the more difficult case is one in which 
the mortgagee has not yet won a judgment in a foreclosure action, 
and is, therefore, not the legal owner.210 However, laws requiring 
postjudgment advances and permitting prejudgment advances from 
mortgagee to receiver211 suggest that the state legislature did not 
intend that receivers should bear maintenance costs alone. 
Appointed receivers may have a legal duty to correct Housing 
Maintenance Code violations, but there is no expectation that they 
use their own personal funds to do so.212 
Courts have begun to recognize that they can craft equitable 
rules to bridge this problematic statutory gap. In Fourth Federal 
Savings Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., the Appellate Division 
reasoned (in dicta) that a court might order the mortgagee to 
make an advance to the receiver when the order appointing the 
receiver contemplated further expenses beyond the receiver’s 
available funds, thus requiring court approval.213 Tracking the 
language of the statute, there the appointing order also “required 
the receiver to ‘make repairs necessary to the preservation of the 
property’ and to give priority to ‘the correction of immediately 
hazardous and hazardous violations of housing maintenance 
laws.’”214 In light of this, the court could “order the person who 
                                                          
208 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8004(b) (McKinney 1981). 
209 Union Sav. Bank v. 285 Lafayette Assocs., supra note 15, at 21; 
Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev. v. Greenpoint Sav. Bank, 646 N.Y.S.2d 601, 
605–06 (Civ. Ct. 1995) (holding bank liable for fines, pre-RPAPL section 
1307, where bank already won a judgment but allowed twenty-nine months to 
elapse between judgment and sale, during which time it failed to maintain the 
premises or provide heat and hot water). 
210 N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(44) (McKinney 2001) (defining 
“owner”); Union Sav. Bank v. 285 Lafayette Assocs., supra note 15, at 21. 
211 C.P.L.R. 8004(b) (postjudgment); MULT. DWELL. § 302-b(1) 
(prejudgment). 
212 Herz et al., supra note 26, at 38. 
213 Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 588, 
589–90 (App. Div. 1997). 
214 Id. at 589 (quoting the appointing order, tracking the language of 
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applied for the receiver—in this case, plaintiff bank—to pay for 
necessary expenditures in cases where the receiver lacks the 
funds to do so.”215 The court reasoned that, “if such necessary 
repairs were funded by rents paid by the tenants . . . [it] would 
lead to the inequitable result of compelling tenants to advance 
funds for housing which they are not receiving.”216 Breach of the 
warranty of habitability, after all, is a defense to an eviction 
proceeding for nonpayment of rent, and state law recognizes that 
tenants need not pay (full) rent for apartments that are fire-
damaged, unheated, or lacking other essentials.217 Fourth Federal 
merely recognizes that this principle ought not change in the 
event the owner faces foreclosure. Therefore, courts should 
require prejudgment advances where the circumstances call for 
it, and where equity supports it.218 
B. Weighing the Equities in Multiple Dwellings in 
Foreclosure 
Considering all the circumstances includes considering the 
mortgagee’s position as well as that of innocent tenants. Keeping 
the building in good repair is necessarily and obviously 
incidental to the mortgagee’s purpose, and often benefits its 
bottom-line.219 The rational profit-maximizing mortgagee must 
wish to preserve the value of the mortgaged property—the 
collateral for its loan—during the foreclosure action,220 because it 
usually ends up selling the building to recoup unpaid amounts 
due from the mortgagor.221 In the event of a sale, a building in 
                                                          
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325(3)(b) (McKinney 2009)). 
215 Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 590 (citing C.P.L.R. 
8004(b)). 
216 Id. 
217 See Jenkins v. Fieldbridge Assocs., LLC, 877 N.Y.S.2d 375, 376 
(App. Div. 2009) (enforcing rent reduction order issued by state agency). 
218 Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 589–90; City Council 
Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 15 n.49. 
219 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
220 See Litho Fund Equities, Inc. v. Alley Spring Apartments Corp., 462 
N.Y.S.2d 907, 908 (App. Div. 1983). 
221 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1354 (McKinney 2009). Perhaps, if 
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better condition commands a higher price.222 Likewise, a 
mortgagee who retains the property would benefit from its better 
condition by being able to command higher rents.223 Tenant 
advocates have pointed out, and this Note also urges, that there 
are other, less obvious equitable considerations to balance: the 
circumstances surrounding the building’s financial condition 
when the loan was originated, who the plaintiff is, the 
availability of funds, and broader effects such as blight. Taken 
together, it is often unfair to impose the cost of repairs during a 
gap period (or the cost of suffering without repairs) on innocent 
tenants rather than on foreclosing mortgagees. 
1. Holding Reckless Lenders Accountable 
As described above in Part III, predatory equity has wreaked 
havoc on affordable housing and has worked to pull apart 
diverse, urban neighborhoods by giving owners perverse 
incentives to push out tenants paying below-market rents. 
Although owners may face direct liability for harassing tenants, 
there is also support for finding mortgagees liable at equity 
when the lender’s participation in such a plan was reckless or 
                                                          
there is a settlement, the mortgagor retains the building for at least some 
time, during which the mortgagee benefits from the mortgagor’s continued 
payments on the mortgage note. AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM, STATEMENT 
OF PRINCIPLES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE MODIFICATION 
OF SECURITIZED SUBPRIME RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS 1 (2007), available 
at http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF%20Subprime% 
20Loan%20Modification%20Principles_060107.pdf (“The modification 
provisions that govern loans that are in default or reasonably foreseeable default 
typically also require that the modifications be in the best interests of the 
securityholders or not materially adverse to the interests of the 
securityholders.”). 
222 Idan Holding Corp. v. 244 Water Realty Corp., 154 N.Y.S.2d 396 
(Sup. Ct. 1956) (“[T]he preservation of the property inures to the benefit of 
the plaintiff whether he subsequently becomes the purchaser at the foreclosure 
sale or whether he preserves it merely because he may receive full value 
therefore when the sale is held.”); Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and 
Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 
S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 845 (1980). 
223 See In re Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Project, 222 N.Y.S.2d 786, 
797 (App. Div. 1961). 
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negligent and injured tenants.224 In the run-up to the 2008 market 
collapse, many banks turned a blind eye to the foreseeable harm 
their actions posed to third parties.225 Although many individual 
loan officers probably did not consider the effect that lax 
underwriting and oversize loans would have on long-term 
tenants of properties being purchased, large institutions should 
have been aware of troubling trends.226 Their customers, 
especially purchasers of distressed properties, generally view 
remaining tenants as a costly nuisance.227 But prearranging tenant 
harassment and coercion through unsustainable financing is 
another story. Putting tenants’ feet to the fire by withholding 
services or repairs is illegal.228 Investors who state their intent to 
                                                          
224 City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 15 (“[A] bank’s 
decision to offer [a] disproportionately high level of funding—i.e., 
‘overleveraging’ the property—often contributes to the owner’s default, the 
physical deterioration of the building and the receiver’s inability to fund 
maintenance and repairs from the rent rolls.”). But see LEFCOE, supra note 
158, at 193 (“[T]he concept of suitability has little current support in the case 
law . . . . [L]enders do not even owe borrowers the duty of care to avoid 
negligence in the lending process.”). 
225 Michael Lewis, It’s the Economy, Dummkopf!, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 
2011), http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2011/09/europe-201109 
(“[T]raders may have sunk their firms by turning a blind eye to the risks in 
the subprime-bond market, but they made a fortune . . . and have for the 
most part never been called to account.”). 
226 City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 15. 
227 Bruce J. Bergman, So Your Client Wants to Buy at a Foreclosure 
Sale: Pitfalls and Possibilities, N.Y. ST. B. J., Sept. 2003, at 43, 45 (“[I]n a 
perfect world, the defaulting borrower, or his tenants, would quietly depart 
the foreclosed premises after the foreclosure sale and before the closing.”). 
228 N.Y.C. CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2004(a)(48), 27-
2005(d) (N.Y. Legal Publishing Corp. 1993 & Supp. 2011); N.Y. REAL 
PROP. LAW § 235-d (McKinney 2006) (“[I]t shall be unlawful . . . for any 
landlord . . . to engage in . . . interruption or discontinuance or willful 
failure to restore services . . . if such conduct is intended to cause the tenant 
. . . to vacate.”); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 241.05 (McKinney 2008) 
(“An owner is guilty of harassment of a rent regulated tenant when with 
intent to cause a rent regulated tenant to vacate a housing accommodation, 
such owner . . . intent[ionally] . . . [or r]ecklessly causes physical injury to 
such tenant or to a third person. Harassment of a rent regulated tenant is a 
class E felony.”). 
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“improve[ the] tenant base”229 of affordable housing by 
aggressively pursuing turnover should have raised red flags to 
lenders.230 There is also ample evidence that, aided by stubborn 
residential segregation and redlining, the current foreclosure 
crisis has disproportionately affected minority homeowners.231 
Banks should also be held to account for the effects of similar 
discrimination against renters in communities of color. 
Legislatures have consistently adopted tenant-protectionist 
views in response to the threat of predatory equity,232 and courts 
should follow suit. Despite there being no clear statutory 
authority, a court may use its equitable power to order the 
lender to pay for repairs where the lender’s negligence or 
recklessness in making a loan based on unrealistic expectations 
of high turnover resulted in improper pressure on the mortgagor 
to harass or coerce tenants into leaving by withholding repairs or 
services.233 That many banks received credit on their Community 
                                                          
229 Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting 
Portfolio, MILBANK, http://www.milbankre.com/portfolio.php (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2012) (“Milbank identified [its Bronx] assets as having added value 
for its investors and that revitalization would occur by infusing the capital 
necessary to improve the condition of the buildings, as well as aggressively 
pursuing the collection of past-due rents—allowing for an improved tenant 
base.”)). 
230 See ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., supra note 85, at 22–
25.  
231 City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 4; Steil, supra note 80, 
at 76–86; Dunn, supra note 80. But see EDWARD L. GLAESER & JACOB 
VIGDOR, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, THE END OF THE 
SEGREGATED CENTURY 3–7 (2012) (arguing that U.S. cities are today more 
racially integrated than at any time since 1910). Plaintiffs have sued banks 
such as Wells Fargo (the trustee in Milbank) for discriminatory lending 
practices. Steil, supra note 80, at 85 n.73 (describing suit alleging bank 
targeted African-Americans for subprime loans by classifying applicants by 
race in the bank’s internal mortgage application software). 
232 See, e.g., City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 10 (describing 
rationale behind the Tenant Harassment Act, N.Y.C. CHARTER & ADMIN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 27-2004(a)(48), 27-2005(d) (N.Y. Legal Publishing Corp. 
1993)). 
233 Katherine M. Lehe, Comment, Cracks in the Foundation of Federal 
Law: Ameliorating the Ongoing Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis Through 
Broader Predatory Lending Relief and Deterrence, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2049, 
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Reinvestment Act exams for making these oversized loans in 
low- and moderate-income census tracts makes an accounting all 
the more compelling.234 When a court has no other tool to 
adequately address wrongful conduct, it may use its equitable 
powers to reach a fair result. 
2. When the Plaintiff Isn’t the Original Lender 
The “reckless lender” argument is somewhat less persuasive 
where the mortgage note has been bought and sold several 
times, and the plaintiff in the foreclosure action did not originate 
the loan.235 Indeed, the Uniform Commercial Code, which 
governs the sale of promissory notes associated with mortgages, 
insulates a “holder in due course” from preexisting property 
claims, unless the purchaser had actual knowledge of the prior 
claim.236 At first blush, the “holder in due course” doctrine 
                                                          
2069–84 (2010). The new federal Consumer Finance Protection Bureau also 
has wide authority to regulate consumer mortgage lending, and could 
presumably add protections against predatory equity, but it is not clear that it 
will do so. See Kerri Panchuk, CFPB Outlines Mortgage Servicing 
Regulation Strategy, HOUSINGWIRE (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.housing 
wire.com/2011/10/13/cfpb-outlines-mortgage-servicing-regulation-strategy; 
see also David Reiss, Message in a Mortgage, 31 B.U. REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018940. 
234 UNIV. NEIGHBORHOOD HOUS. PROGRAM, NEW YORK CITY’S 
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING IN DISTRESS 29 (2011), available at http://www.unhp. 
org/pdf/MultifamilyDistress.pdf. 
235 Union Sav. Bank v. 285 Lafayette Assocs., supra note 15. 
236 N.Y. U.C.C. LAW §§ 9-109(a)(3), 9-109 cmt. 7 (McKinney 2002) 
(“The security interest in the promissory note is covered by this Article even 
though the note is secured by a real-property mortgage.”). Article 9 “does 
not determine the circumstances under which and the extent to which a 
person who is obligated on a negotiable instrument is disabled from asserting 
claims and defenses. Rather, Article 3 must be consulted. See, e.g., Sections 
3-305, 3-306.” § 9-403 cmt. 2. New York’s U.C.C. Article 3, Section 3-
304(7) provides that “to constitute notice of a claim or defense, the purchaser 
must have knowledge of the claim or defense or knowledge of such facts that 
his action in taking an instrument amounts to bad faith.” N.Y. U.C.C. LAW 
§ 3-304(7) (McKinney 2001). The subsequent purchaser of a mortgage note, 
as a “holder in due course,” takes it free and clear of claims to the note, 
unless it has actual notice of the claims. In re AppOnline.com, Inc., 285 
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would seem to absolve many subsequent holders of mortgage 
notes, including investment trusts holding mortgage-backed 
securities, from preexisting claims relating to the mortgage, such 
as claims that the loan originator engaged in predatory 
lending.237 But neither Article 3, which contains the “holder in 
due course” bar, nor Article 9, which governs the sale of 
promissory notes, speaks to claims by third parties, unrelated to 
ownership of the note, and arising after the interest in the 
mortgage and note changes hands.238 Breaches of the warranty of 
habitability and violations of the Housing Maintenance Code are 
often continuous, ongoing breaches and violations.239 Thus, a 
mortgagee’s “holder in due course” status should not bar this 
kind of relief. Still, without something more, the equities may 
not favor liability for a seemingly blameless successor 
mortgagee before it obtains a judgment of foreclosure.240  
                                                          
B.R. 805, 819 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2002) (interpreting New York law), aff’d, 
321 B.R. 614 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 128 F. App’x 171 (2d Cir. 2004). 
Further, the purchaser’s rights are not “affected by constructive notice, 
unless it clearly appear[s] that the inquiry suggested by the facts disclosed at 
the time of the purchase would[,] if fairly pursued[,] result in the discovery 
of the defect existing but hidden at the time.” Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co. v. 
Sapowitch, 72 N.E.2d 166, 169 (N.Y. 1947) (quoting Birdsall v. Russell, 29 
N.Y. 220, 250 (1864) (Wright, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). New 
York is the only state that has not adopted the revised Article 3. PERMANENT 
EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, APPLICATION OF THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO MORTGAGE 
NOTES 2 n.6 (2011), available at http://ali.org/00021333/PEB%20 
Report%20-%20November%202011.pdf. 
237 Lehe, supra note 233, at 2066 (“[M]any borrowers who seek to 
challenge their mortgage loans as predatory find that the ‘holder in due 
course’ doctrine bars suit against the assignee who currently holds the 
mortgage note, and assignment of the mortgage precludes them from bringing 
suit against the mortgage originator.”). 
238 See U.C.C. §§ 3-304(7), 9-403; see also Kurt Eggert, Held Up in 
Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due 
Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 607–35 (2002) (recommending 
eliminating the holder in due course doctrine for all noncommercial loans). 
239 Bartley v. Walentas, 434 N.Y.S.2d 379, 383 (App. Div. 1980). 
240 Union Sav. Bank v. 285 Lafayette Assocs., supra note 15, at 21; cf. 
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 2009) (imposing 
postjudgment duty to maintain premises on foreclosing mortgagee). 
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The Milbank decision sheds light on this thorny issue. The court, 
relying on Fourth Federal, only considered whether the party who 
sought the receiver was aware of the receiver’s likely deficit. It did 
not ask whether the Comm trust knew about the buildings’ finances 
when it acquired the mortgage note.241 Given this appellate authority, 
a New York foreclosure court deciding a similar claim need not 
quibble about the precise identity of the plaintiff.242 It might be more 
difficult to impose liability on the trust as opposed to the original 
lender, but this did not prevent the Milbank court from doing so.243 
The trust became liable when it asked the foreclosure court to 
appoint a receiver yet failed to investigate and disclose the 
precarious financial situation the receiver would inherit.244 However, 
the court is still likely to look for some other reason to support 
finding the subsequent purchaser of a mortgage note liable for 
damages that are several steps removed from its own actions. 
In some ways, the plaintiff can nearly always be linked back 
to the original lender. In Milbank, the plaintiff was not the 
original lender—the original mortgage lender was Deutsche 
Bank.245 Deutsche Bank repackaged the mortgage note into a 
huge mortgage-backed securities trust, which it sold to 
investors.246 While there was a lack of one-to-one identity, the 
demand for mortgages to back such securities was a driving 
                                                          
241 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 18. 
242 See Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 
588, 590 (App. Div. 1997). 
243 Milbank, No. 380454/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. Sept. 29, 2010) 
(granting motion “for reasons stated on the record”); Milbank Transcript, 
supra note 3, at 18–19. Although the plaintiff in Milbank argued it should not 
be liable because it created a special-purpose L.L.C., which took title to the 
mortgage note, the L.L.C. was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Comm 
trust, a subterfuge the Milbank court easily saw past. Reply Brief of Tenant-
Defendants, supra note 168, at 2. Even though the trust was owned by 
investors who were not parties to the action, the trust itself was nevertheless 
held liable. Id. 
244 Reply Brief of Tenant-Defendants, supra note 168, at 2. But see 
LEFCOE, supra note 158, at 178–79 (describing difficulty of due diligence for 
mortgage-backed securities investors and tendency to freeload). 
245 Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1. 
246 Id. 
624 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
force behind banks’ making loans with lax underwriting.247 In 
this way, the beneficiaries of the Comm trust played a role in 
causing the outsized loan to be made (though granted, someone 
else may have bought the securities if they had not).248 In this 
way, a link, however attenuated, can be drawn from the loan 
originator to the plaintiff in the foreclosure action. 
Aside from identity, this also raises questions of what duties 
a mortgage investor (or trustee) owes to third parties when it 
acquires or forecloses on a mortgage.249 The scope of inquiry 
required at first seems potentially huge—the ten Bronx apartment 
buildings in Milbank were only a small piece of a multibillion-
dollar investment vehicle.250 But a mortgage-backed securities 
holder like the Comm trust need not scrutinize the books of 
every single mortgagor it forecloses on for likely deficits from 
spending money on repairs—most of its mortgages are likely for 
single-family homes for which no receiver is likely to be 
sought.251 If, however, the property is an occupied multiple 
dwelling and the mortgagee seeks a receiver, courts have found 
that equity calls for an inquiry.252 The basic premise—that 
                                                          
247 See Been et al., supra note 69, at 390 (“The ability of mortgage 
originators to remove mortgages from their books through securitization may 
have also weakened originators’ incentives to carefully screen potential loans 
and borrowers, as they retained little exposure to the risk of the originated 
loans.”); Demyanyk & Van Hemert, supra note 82, at 1872 (“[L]enders were 
to some extent aware of high [loan-to-value] ratios being increasingly 
associated with risky borrowers.”); Maddaloni & Peydró, supra note 82, at 
2124. 
248 But see Nelson D. Schwartz & Shaila Dewan, Political Push Moves a 
Deal On Mortgages Inches Closer, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/business/a-deal-on-foreclosures-inches-
closer.html (“Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio said the settlement [between 
lenders, federal officials, and state attorneys general] as reported—its details 
were not fully known—was too small and would allow banks to pass on the 
cost of the settlement to ‘middle-class Americans’ whose pension funds hold 
soured mortgage securities.”). 
249 See LEFCOE, supra note 158, at 178–79. 
250 Milbank Tenants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 2, at 1. 
251 See infra Part V.C.2. 
252 Land v. Esrig, 43 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (“The plaintiff 
may not be heard to object when called upon to meet an ordinary obligation 
necessarily and obviously incidental to the relief which he himself sought, 
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tenants should not have to pay for housing they do not receive—
is the same regardless of who holds the mortgage and note.253 
While imposing costs on a mortgagee who did not make a 
reckless loan is less than ideal, it would be inequitable to allow 
innocent tenants to continue to suffer because of a mortgagor’s 
failure, and a receiver’s inability, to comply with the Housing 
Maintenance Code and warranty of habitability.254 
3. Other Equitable Concerns 
Costs to the parties to the foreclosure action should not be 
the court’s only concern. Blight has worsened during the 
subprime-lending crisis,255 and the Milbank rule helps prevent 
neglected buildings from depressing neighboring property 
values.256 Abandoned properties also pose risks to neighbors, 
since they are magnets for squatters, fires, and crime.257 
Requiring the foreclosure plaintiff to pay for upkeep during the 
proceeding is a perfect complement to state laws that aim to 
fight blight by requiring foreclosing lenders to maintain 
                                                          
obtained and from which he reaped benefits.”). A duty of inquiry might also 
be considered a quid pro quo for the limited liability a mortgagee enjoys with 
a receiver in place. See supra text accompanying notes 49–52. 
253 See Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 
588, 590 (App. Div. 1997). 
254 City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 14–17; see Part V.D 
infra (discussing implications). 
255 See Meribah Knight & Bridget O’Shea, Foreclosures Leave Pockets of 
Neglect and Decay, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/28/us/foreclosures-lead-to-crime-and-decay-in-abandoned-buildings. 
html. 
256 See, e.g., City Council Amicus Brief, supra note 19, at 5–6; Creola 
Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in 
Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1169; Charles 
Towe & Chad Lawley, The Contagion Effect of Neighboring Foreclosures 1 
(May 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1834805. 
257 William Harless, In Richmond, Foreclosed Homes Breed a New Kind 
of Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/11/13/us/in-richmond-foreclosed-homes-breed-a-new-kind-of-problem. 
html. 
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properties after obtaining a judgment,258 and is even more 
effective at nipping the problem in the bud. 
Not only does this rule allow the lender to prevent the value 
of its collateral from further deteriorating and creating blight, 
but it also places the cost of upkeep on the party best able to 
bear it.259 Anticipating these costs, lenders can spread them 
among mortgagors by setting slightly higher interest rates on 
mortgage loans or charging small fees,260 which efficiently places 
the cost where it should be—on mortgagors, as a kind of 
insurance.261 While lenders may no doubt pass added costs on to 
mortgage consumers—and owners, in turn, to renters—the 
overall effect will be negligible.262 
Finally, applying the Milbank equitable rule avoids relying 
on undesirable, resource-intensive, and often-unavailable 
                                                          
258 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 2009). 
259 Most large U.S. mortgage lenders have benefited marvelously from 
federal bailout funds, yet they have largely refused to reduce principal 
balances for underwater borrowers. Neil M. Barofsky, Where the Bank 
Bailout Went Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/03/30/opinion/30barofsky.html; see also Gretchen Morgenson, The 
Deal Is Done, but Hold the Applause, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/business/mortgage-settlement-leaves-
much-to-be-desired-fair-game.html. 
260 See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson & Greg Hitt, Mortgage ‘Cramdown’ 
Plan Hits Turbulence in Senate, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2009), http://online. 
wsj.com/article/SB123698730201425761.html (describing banking industry’s 
effort to derail plan for homeowners’ mortgage write-downs, saying it 
“would add risk to lenders, raise mortgage rates and clog courts”); cf. Bank 
of America plans $5 debit card fee, CBS NEWS (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/09/29/business/main20113708.shtml 
(describing banks’ response to federal regulation imposing additional per-
transaction costs for debit card use); Eric Dash, Banks Quietly Ramp Up 
Costs To Consumers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2011/11/14/business/banks-quietly-ramp-up-consumer-fees.html 
(describing more subtle ways banks are responding to the same situation, 
after Bank of America backed down from its $5 debit card fee). 
261 Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection 
Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 491 (1991) (“[T]he relatively modest costs 
associated with state mortgagor protection laws do suggest that mortgagor 
protections may indeed promote economic efficiency.”). 
262 See infra Part V.D (discussing implications). 
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government intervention to make costly emergency repairs—at 
the expense of taxpayers—in exchange for a tax lien on the 
property.263 Intervention, while sometimes available where an 
owner has abandoned the property, is even less desirable where 
a receiver controls the premises. This is because the lender 
requested the receiver in order to protect its security and is 
concerned about the condition of the building (if only for its 
resale value), and because the lender must pay the receiver’s 
expenses upon judgment and usually has the assets to do so.264 
4. Which Repairs Should Be Covered by the Rule? 
If the foreclosure court orders the mortgagee to pay for 
repairs, it is an open question how serious a code violation must 
be to trigger the lender’s contribution. Broken locks threaten the 
safety of the tenants,265 and cascading water leaks have long been 
considered by New York City agencies to be a serious condition 
meriting intervention,266 but it is less clear that a leaky radiator 
pipe in only one apartment should deserve the same attention. 
Painted-over peepholes are also a threat to tenants’ security, but 
not clearly as serious as a broken front door lock. Courts must 
decide whether a duty to abate an infestation of rats or mice also 
extends to roaches and bedbugs. The N.Y.C. Department of 
Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) uses a letter 
grading system that, while flawed, offers a handy proxy for 
which items should be the lender’s financial responsibility and 
which should await a new owner.267  
                                                          
263 See supra Part III.C. 
264 See supra Part II. 
265 Chris Opfer, Foreclosures Leave Apartment Buildings in Need of 
Repair, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Sept. 2011), http://www.gothamgazette.com/ 
article/housing/20110915/10/3603. 
266 Press Release, Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., HPD Commissioner 
Cestero and Speaker Quinn Release Findings on First Round of Extensive 
Inspections at Milbank Buildings (Nov. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/pr2010/pr-10-19-10.shtml. 
267 Indeed, the definitions of B and C violations track the language of the 
state statute requiring receivers to prioritize correction of dangerous 
violations, reflecting a judgment of the legislature that some repairs are more 
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The letter grading system uses grades of A, B, or C, with C 
violations being the most serious.268 State law provides that the 
receiver shall give priority to the correction of “immediately 
hazardous and hazardous violations” of the code, which 
correspond to class “B” and “C” violations.269 Not all violations 
(especially “A” violations) constitute a breach of the warranty of 
habitability.270 Funds spent to correct “B” and “C” violations are 
therefore most likely to be judicious expenditures, and this 
should be a reliable cutoff for receivers and lenders when 
measuring compliance with their legal duties. 
C. Applications of the Milbank Rule 
While HPD’s violations definitions provide a bright-line rule, 
the Milbank rule itself does not, and the rule’s applications are 
not always so clear-cut. The trial court in Milbank extended an 
equity rule contemplated by the appellate court in Fourth 
Federal, without any certain appellate authority.271 At least one 
other trial court, in National Bank v. 5th Avenue Group, has 
followed suit.272 In late 2009, the owner of a small apartment 
                                                          
urgent than others. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325(3)(b) (McKinney 
2009). 
268 HPD Online Glossary, supra note 163 (“The law establishes three 
classes of violations which are: ‘A’, non-hazardous; ‘B’, hazardous; or ‘C’, 
immediately hazardous.”). 
269 Id. 
270 Park W. Mgmt. Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1294 (N.Y. 
1979) (“Housing codes do not provide a complete delineation of the 
landlord’s obligation, but rather serve as a starting point in that determination 
by establishing minimal standards that all housing must meet.” (citing Boston 
Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 844 n.16 (Mass. 1973))). New 
York also requires HPD to promulgate a list of which violations are “rent-
impairing,” or serve as the basis for rent abatement or a defense to a suit for 
the nonpayment of rent. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a (McKinney 
2001). 
271 Milbank Transcript, supra note 3, at 18–19 (“[E]ven though there’s 
no authority before and it’s not been done before perhaps except in that one 
case you cite . . . .”). 
272 Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Dec. 20, 2011). 
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building in Brooklyn stopped paying its mortgage, and the bank 
began to foreclose on the building.273 Intermittent heat and hot 
water, roof leaks, and an unsecured front door plagued the six 
tenants, many of whom were elderly or disabled.274 One year 
later, the court appointed a receiver to collect rents and maintain 
the property, but the receiver could not spend more than $2,000 
at a time without the bank’s consent.275 The receiver hired 
workers to fix the roof, but the leaks continued.276 In May 2011, 
the tenants asked the foreclosure court for relief.277 By 
September, their motion still pending, the building’s front door 
remained unsecured, its locks broken.278 Worse, the property 
seemed doomed from the start: its income was not nearly 
enough to service the $1.85 million mortgage.279 In December 
2011, the court granted the tenants’ motion in full, directing the 
plaintiff mortgagee to advance funds to the receiver to cover the 
cost of emergency repairs, reasoning that, “it would be equitable 
for plaintiff to be required to advance funds to the Receiver 
where rental income is insufficient for the Receiver to fulfill his 
                                                          
273 Opfer, supra note 265. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. (“‘That’s always been a problem. They fix it and then all of a 
sudden it’s damaged again,’ said Raymond Jimenez, a retired butcher who 
has lived in his fourth floor apartment for 48 years.”). 
279 For example, a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage at 5.5% interest, (a 
conservative estimate), would have required monthly rental income of 
$30,500 to sustain the mortgage payments. Affidavit of Heather Gershen at 
paras. 8–9, Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Nov. 16, 2009). The six rent-regulated tenants 
paid a combined $1,577 per month. Brief of Tenant-Defendants at paras. 3–
4, Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Kings Cnty. Nov. 16, 2009). The building contains one other residential 
unit and two commercial units that pay market rents, with a maximum total 
rent roll of $8,463 per month, nowhere close to thirty thousand dollars. Id. at 
para. 5. In order to get the loan, the owner cross-collateralized its interest in 
the neighboring building, which itself had a $1.95 million mortgage. Reply 
Affirmation at para. 3, Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 
29057/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Nov. 16, 2009). 
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duty to repair and maintain the premises.”280 Nor, as the court 
explained, was this designed to be a windfall to the tenants or 
the receiver: “assuming the building is not ‘overleveraged,’ . . . 
plaintiff will be made whole upon the sale of the property.”281 
While trial courts seem to be receptive to extending the Milbank 
rule, the following examples demonstrate that, in some 
situations, application of the rule is not so straightforward. 
1. Bedbugs 
Whether the lender should pay for extermination of an 
apartment building with six units where the tenants complain of 
a building-wide bedbug282 infestation will depend on the degree 
of the necessity of the expenditures. Bedbugs are currently 
classified as a “B” violation of the Housing Maintenance 
Code;283 therefore, the lender could be found responsible for 
paying for the extermination, since it is the receiver’s duty to 
correct “hazardous” conditions.284 But there could also be a 
hidden causal factor if one of the tenants brought the bedbugs 
in, in which case it is less clear that the mortgagee should be 
responsible. Although exterminating bedbugs might have little 
impact on the building’s long-term value, an infestation impacts 
the habitability of the units for the current tenants and affects the 
building’s current income if units cannot be rented. Provided the 
“judicious expense” prong of the Milbank test is met, an 
equitable remedy seems appropriate. 
2. Single-Family Rental Homes 
Unlike in a multiple dwelling, a tenant of a one-family home 
in foreclosure faces an uphill battle to benefit from Milbank, 
                                                          
280 Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Dec. 20, 2011). 
281 Id. 
282 See Bed Bugs, HPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/tenants/Bed-
Bugs.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2011). 
283 See Sample Notice of Violation, HPD, http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/ 
downloads/pdf/bed-bugs-sample1.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
284 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1325 (McKinney 2009). 
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because it would require extending the law with no clear 
precedent (since the case law discussed so far deals only with 
multiple dwellings).285 Tenants of single-family homes are 
protected by the warranty of habitability,286 a foreclosing 
mortgagee must maintain the premises after judgment,287 and 
there is still a gap period between default and judgment. But the 
principal problem is that receivers are rarely sought for single-
family homes, and thus there is no statutory support (RPAPL 
section 1325) for an equitable determination.288 The mortgagee 
does risk becoming directly liable as a “mortgagee in 
possession” if it takes steps to repair the property or collect rent 
without a receiver in place, but mortgagees understandably steer 
clear of these liabilities.289 While the tenant might not be able to 
obtain immediate relief against the bankrupt owner in a separate 
action, that avenue is available.290 In the end, the amounts 
involved are likely smaller than in a multiple dwelling, making 
self-help more feasible.291 The tenant can then sue the owner and 
wait in line along with the owner’s other creditors,292 or attempt 
to further extend the Milbank rule. 
3. Where No Receiver Is Appointed 
In buildings with fewer than six units, the mortgagee 
plaintiff often forgoes seeking a receiver.293 Arguably, the Fourth 
                                                          
285 But see Lirosi v. Elkins, 453 N.Y.S.2d 718, 723 (App. Div. 1982) 
(“[A] court of equity is not precluded from fashioning a suitable remedy, 
although precedent is wanting.”).  
286 REAL PROP. ACTS. § 235-b; Birch v. Ryan, 721 N.Y.S.2d 711, 711–
12 (App. Div. 2001). 
287 REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1307. 
288 See Rasmussen, supra note 16. 
289 Mortimer v. E. Side Sav. Bank, 295 N.Y.S. 695, 698 (App. Div. 
1937); Rasmussen, supra note 16. 
290 See supra Part III.D. 
291 See supra Part III.D. 
292 See supra Part III.D. 
293 Rasmussen, supra note 16 (“Receivers . . . are not usually appointed 
to care for the small buildings that are the subject of the vast majority of 
foreclosure actions now.”). 
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Federal equitable inquiry is irrelevant in a case where there is 
no receiver, the mortgagor is still in possession, or where the 
mortgagee comes into possession. While legislatures increasingly 
pass laws to protect tenants at foreclosure, at the same time 
there is a desire to avoid fees and costs to small owners who 
actually live in their buildings.294 Moreover, the tenants of a 
small building may find it less likely for a live-in owner to skip 
town (or skimp on repairs) and easier to compel the owner to 
make repairs in an HP action.295  
4. Affordable Loans and Not-for-Profit Lenders 
While Milbank held a mortgagee accountable for a loan that 
should possibly never have been made, its application to a 
lender who made an affordable loan or to a not-for-profit lender 
is more problematic because no “predatory equity” angle is 
present and the lender likely has fewer assets at its disposal. 
Milbank’s four-part equitable test does not necessarily speak to 
this one way or the other. The court’s analysis focused on 
whether the foreclosing mortgage lender had been aware that the 
building’s income would be insufficient to pay the receiver’s 
expenses when it asked that the court appoint a receiver.296 
Application of the test would still result in a mortgagee’s 
responsibility to pay for repairs, even though it made an 
affordable loan, if the receiver’s anticipated expenses were more 
than the anticipated income when the plaintiff sought to have a 
receiver appointed.297 Nonprofits may have less capital to finance 
interim upkeep, but they would still be liable for postjudgment 
upkeep under the statute, which does not exempt them.298 
                                                          
294 Hearings, supra note 1, at 164–65 (testimony of Elizabeth M. Lynch, 
MFY Legal Servs.); E-mail from Brad Lander, N.Y.C. Councilmember, to 
author (Nov. 13, 2011, 8:51 AM EST) (on file with author). 
295 In an HP action, the tenant sues the owner and the Department of 
Housing Preservation and Development seeking repairs to correct outstanding 
violations. See supra Part III.D. 
296 Fourth Fed. Sav. Bank v. 32-22 Owners Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 588, 
590 (App. Div. 1997). 
297 Id. 
298 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1307 (McKinney 2009). 
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Alternatively, if the law were to require the lender to post a 
compliance bond, it may not bear such a heavy financial 
burden.299 In sum, despite its difficult application, the Milbank 
rule is workable and malleable enough to make it a viable option 
for tenants who have difficulty seeking repairs from owners in 
foreclosure. 
D. Implications of Extending Milbank 
There are a few problematic implications of extending the 
Milbank rule, such as increased costs to borrowers, disincentives 
for foreclosure plaintiffs to seek receivers, and the propriety of 
extending a liability rule in response to a crisis, since conditions 
that currently justify reform may no longer exist in the future. 
Taken together, however, the positive outcomes that would 
result from wider application of the Milbank rule significantly 
outweigh these consequences. 
Banks may assert that the rule will decrease mortgage 
lending, or make it more costly to lend to people at the 
margins.300 But Milbank was an exceptional case in that most 
buildings in foreclosure will not require millions of dollars in 
additional funds to correct hazardous conditions.301 Banks have 
shown that they can survive new regulatory requirements that 
have significantly hurt their bottom line. For example, the cost 
of compliance with new interchange fees for debit card 
purchases will run into the billions, yet banks are finding small-
bore ways of recouping these losses.302 In the context of 
mortgage lending, where fees are already substantial and rising, 
the net effect on consumers of a small market-wide increase due 
                                                          
299 See infra Part VI. 
300 See, e.g., Williamson & Hitt, supra note 260. 
301 See Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. v. 296 5th Ave. Grp., No. 29057/09 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Dec. 20, 2011) (ordering plaintiff to advance funds to 
receiver for repairs estimated to cost $65,150); City Council Amicus Brief, 
supra note 19, at 7 (“In fiscal year 2011, HPD budgeted over $29 million for 
emergency repairs [citywide].”). 
302 See Bank of America plans $5 debit card fee, supra note 260; Dash, 
supra note 260. 
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to the Milbank rule is probably minimal.303 From a public policy 
perspective, spreading the cost of remediating poor housing 
conditions across all mortgage borrowers is desirable because it 
more effectively and more efficiently minimizes the risk of harm 
to more people.304 In addition, slightly increasing the costs of 
borrowing may deliver better incentives to consumers deciding 
whether to rent or buy.305 Federal housing policy has placed too 
strong an emphasis on homeownership, and many people who 
were able to qualify for loans in 2006 would have been better 
off renting instead.306 At bottom, however, extending Milbank 
will probably increase costs to borrowers, but not by any 
appreciable amount.307 It is also possible that extension of the 
                                                          
303 See Amy Hoak, Beware: Mortgage Fees Are Rising, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 26, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203918304 
577239470865575682.html. 
304 See Schill, supra note 261, at 491; cf. Gretchen Morgenson, Hazard 
Insurance with Its Own Perils, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes. com/2012/01/22/business/hazard-insurance-with-its-own-
perils-fair-game.html (“[Instead of forced-place insurance, a] more consumer-
friendly way to deal with insurance lapses would be for [mortgage] servicers to 
advance money to the borrower’s existing [insurance] carrier to keep the policy 
current. Then, the servicer could bill the borrower for the coverage.”). 
305 See Kevin Quealy & Archie Tse, Is It Better to Buy or Rent?, N.Y. 
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/business/buy-rent-calculator.html 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (featuring an interactive tool weighing relative 
costs of renting versus buying). 
306 See generally Arlo Chase, Rethinking the Homeownership Society: 
Rental Stability Alternative, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2010) (arguing for a policy 
shift away from homeownership and toward protecting renters through a 
modified rent-regulation scheme); see also EDWARD L. GLAESER, TRIUMPH 
OF THE CITY 264 (2011) (“The home interest mortgage 
deduction . . . encourages Americans to leverage themselves to the hilt to bet 
on housing . . . . Subsidizing home ownership actually pushes up housing 
prices by encouraging people to spend more.”); CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE 
TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN 69 (2008) (coining the term “NINJA loan,” 
which stands for No Income, No Job or Assets, meaning loans made without 
requiring proof of those typical signs of creditworthiness). 
307 See Gilberto Fuentes, What Causes Mortgage Borrowing Costs to 
Increase?, SF GATE, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/causes-mortgage-
borrowing-costs-increase-8921.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (identifying 
inflation, money supply, and broader economic conditions as the main factors 
driving costs of mortgage borrowing). 
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rule may increase rents for tenants; but, again, the overall effect 
is probably negligible.308 
Aside from mere cost, the plaintiff in Milbank argued that 
extending liability to it would mean that foreclosure plaintiffs 
would no longer be willing to seek receivers.309 But mortgagees 
will still desire to have the limitation on liability that comes with 
the appointment of a receiver, which is unavailable to them as 
mortgagees-in-possession.310 Because of the favorable limitations 
on liability, applying Milbank more broadly is unlikely to affect 
the decision whether or not to seek the appointment of a 
receiver.311 Mortgagees will still need to protect their security 
from deterioration in order to recoup as much as possible from 
the foreclosure sale. If the building needs repair, this is 
practically impossible to accomplish without either having a 
receiver or becoming a mortgagee-in-possession.312 Diverting a 
building’s rental income from the owner and investing it back 
into the building also makes sound business sense because it 
maximizes the value of the loan’s collateral.313 This suggests that 
mortgagees would still seek receivers just as often. 
                                                          
308 See Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing 
Act’s New Frontier, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 180 (1996) 
(explaining how landlords might react to an influx of subsidized tenants by 
spreading the cost across their subsidized and unsubsidized holdings). Costs 
of financing are only one component of what the N.Y.C. Rent Guidelines 
Board considers when deciding on a schedule of increases for rent-stabilized 
apartments. Process by Which the Rent Guidelines Board Determines the 
Guidelines, N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., http://www.housingnyc.com/ 
html/guidelines/guidelines.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (“These include: 
the economic condition of the residential real estate industry in N.Y.C. 
including such factors as the prevailing and projected (i) real estate taxes and 
sewer and water rates, (ii) gross operating maintenance costs (including 
insurance rates, governmental fees, cost of fuel and labor costs), (iii) costs 
and availability of financing (including effective rates of interest), [and] (iv) 
over-all supply of housing accommodations and over-all vacancy rates.”). 
309 Wheeler Affidavit, supra note 157, at para. 4. 
310 See Bankers Fed. Sav. Bank FSB v. Off West Broadway Developers, 
638 N.Y.S.2d 72, 74 (App. Div. 1996). 
311 Herz et al., supra note 26, at 38. 
312 Mortimer v. E. Side Sav. Bank, 295 N.Y.S. 695, 698 (App. Div. 
1937). 
313 Herz et al., supra note 26, at 38. 
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Even if mortgagees are able to bear or distribute the 
additional costs, and still seek receivers, extending a rule of law 
during a financial crisis raises concerns about the rule’s 
applicability after the crisis. Although the current situation 
seems unprecedented,314 dangers to tenants at foreclosure are a 
cyclical, recurring problem.315 The warranty of habitability and 
housing code also do not typically change from boom to bust—
the duty that foreclosing lenders owe to tenants should remain 
constant as well. Those tenants who pay rent are innocent 
victims of a foreclosure, crisis or not.316  
In sum, New York317 courts should extend Milbank to apply 
more broadly where the receivership suffers a foreseeable 
deficit, the expenses are necessary and judicious, and there will 
be some benefit to the mortgagee. In addition, some courts may 
insist on some level of culpability by the current mortgagee if it 
is not the original lender. Extension of the rule will help protect 
innocent renters who, by no fault of their own, suffer adverse 
consequences from their landlords’ defaults. 
VI. STATUTORY REMEDIES FOR TENANTS IN FORECLOSURE 
ACTIONS SHOULD ALSO BE EXPANDED 
Extending the Milbank rule is a vital part of a robust judicial 
response to the foreclosure crisis, but legislatures also have a 
role to play. Because the options available to tenants in such 
situations (including the equitable remedy in Milbank) are few, 
narrow, and uncertain, state legislatures should adopt laws 
                                                          
314 See supra Part III. 
315 Rasmussen, supra note 22. 
316 See Been & Glashausser, supra note 17, at 3. 
317 In other states, tenant advocates and foreclosure courts should 
consider whether equitable relief is available where the equitable factors from 
Milbank are present. If, for instance, a Massachusetts building in foreclosure 
is afflicted with a substantial Sanitary Code violation, under what 
circumstances may the tenant compel the out-of-possession mortgagee to pay 
for repairs before a judgment is entered? See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
111, § 127A (2002); Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 396 N.E.2d 981, 
982–84 (Mass. 1979). After all, the tenant is entitled to stay absent good 
cause for eviction. See supra Part III. This entitlement would serve little 
purpose if the tenant were constructively evicted. 
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formalizing a duty on the part of foreclosing mortgagees to 
maintain the premises during the foreclosure action. This would, 
importantly, close any loophole a lender might exploit by 
declining to seek the appointment of a receiver it would 
otherwise seek,318 or by starting the foreclosure action through a 
mortgage servicer who is not technically the mortgagee.319 
Codifying a legal duty would make it straightforward for tenants 
to seek needed repairs in an action against the mortgagee,320 and 
it would allow courts to skip the messy and searching inquiry 
into whether the lender knew the receiver’s income would be 
inadequate.321 Tenants caught in gap situations would be able to 
seek relief without extensive motion practice.322 Ideally, a legal 
duty on the books would be prophylactic and simply cause 
foreclosing mortgagees to begin to fund necessary repairs as 
soon as a receiver is appointed.323 But realistically, reform at the 
state level may be far off. 
In addition to the duty requirement, state legislatures should 
create compliance-bond-posting requirements for mortgagees 
who seek to foreclose on multiple dwellings. Such laws would 
require the mortgagee to post a bond to cover anticipated costs 
associated with compliance with the applicable housing code and 
warranty of habitability at the start of the foreclosure action.324 
                                                          
318 Brief of Comm 2006-C8, supra note 166, at 7. 
319 Hearings, supra note 1, at 164–65 (testimony of Elizabeth M. Lynch, 
MFY Legal Servs.). If the mortgage servicer is not an assignee, the 
mortgagee may also be a necessary party to the foreclosure action. See J.V. 
Dempsey, Mortgagee or Lienholder as a Proper or Necessary Party to Suit in 
Respect of Contract for Sale of Mortgaged Property, 164 A.L.R. 1044 
(2011). 
320 For example, the statute might authorize New York City tenants to 
bring an HP action against the lender in Housing Court. See supra Part III.D. 
321 See supra Part IV.B.3. A legal duty enacted at the state level would 
obviate the need for Milbank’s four-factor equitable test in order to compel a 
prejudgment advance from the mortgagee to the receiver. 
322 Cf. supra Part III.D (describing the non-availability of relief in 
Housing Court against a receiver in particular and against the owner in 
foreclosure generally). 
323 Brief of Comm 2006-C8, supra note 166, at 2–3 (describing funds 
already advanced to receiver). 
324 See, e.g., Intro. 494, 2011 Leg., 2011 Sess. (N.Y.C. Council 2011), 
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Importantly, this would lessen the burden on mortgagees, 
especially smaller ones, and help stabilize costs. 
There are currently two proposals before the New York City 
Council to enact local laws further strengthening protections for 
tenants at foreclosure.325 Intro 0494-2011 would require mortgagees 
who seek foreclosure to secure and maintain a compliance bond, 
which would be used to cover the cost of compliance with the 
Housing Maintenance Code.326 Intro 0500-2011 would establish a 
duty requiring a foreclosing mortgagee to maintain the property 
during the pendency of the foreclosure action.327 Yet unresolved is 
whether any city law affecting foreclosures or nationally chartered 
banks will, as the bill opponents claim, be preempted by state or 
federal law.328 Both bills have been laid over in committee after a 
hearing,329 and one of the bills’ sponsors reports that the committee 
is working to address the preemption issues and to add a carve-out 
for smaller, owner-occupied multiple dwellings.330  
                                                          
available at http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/ViewReport.ashx?M=R&N=Text 
&GID=61&ID=876270&GUID=9F704201-DB6B-469D-B3F4-6201F52041 
A1&Title=Legislation+Text (proposing to amend N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
27, ch. 2 by adding § 27-2109.1). 
325 The City Council passed Intro 501-2011 into law on February 16, 
2012, requiring foreclosing mortgagees to notify HPD. Intro. 501, 2011 
Leg., 2011 Sess. (N.Y.C. Council 2011), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/ 
ViewReport.ashx?M=R&N=Text&GID=61&ID=1079568&GUID=0487EF
DD-CBF5-4F0E-B66E-4E6A9DFD2A47&Title=Legislation+Text (amending 
the N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 27 by adding § 27-2109.1). While a 
notification requirement is a great start, it does not directly address the plight 
of tenants facing poor housing conditions, especially if one considers that 
HPD may already know about most problem buildings because of the number 
of tenant complaints and violations. 
326 Intro. 494. 
327 Intro. 500, 2011 Leg., 2011 Sess. (N.Y.C. Council 2011), 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/ViewReport.ashx?M=R&N=Text&GID=61&
ID=883506&GUID=EECABA30-EF8D-4B74-ACCE-E66435CE18C1& 
Title=Legislation+Text (proposing to amend the N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE). 
328 See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2721 
(2009) (holding that state regulatory agency could not enforce regulation with 
respect to nationally-chartered banks); Hearings, supra note 1, at 85 
(testimony of Michael P. Smith). 
329 Intro. 494; Intro. 500. 
330 E-mail from Brad Lander, supra note 294; Hearings, supra note 1, at 
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Even if the mayor signs these measures into law, worrisome 
concerns remain about state- or federal-law preemption of a 
local law affecting the foreclosure process or regulating 
nationally chartered banks.331 Passing new tenant protections at 
the state level would alleviate any concern about state-law 
preemption.332 Likewise, passing bank regulation at the federal 
level could mollify any concern about federal-law preemption.333 
But these are much more daunting challenges than attempts to 
pass local legislation.334 Even though it is unlikely to pass at the 
state or federal level, advocates should continue to push for 
positive reform, since current statutory schemes are inadequate 
to protect tenants,335 and an equitable remedy against a lender 
will only aid those who can show that the mortgagee was aware 
of a likely deficit when it asked for the receiver.336 A statutory 
solution would contribute greatly to protecting tenants. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Extending Milbank will help protect tenants of multiple 
dwellings during the gap period between a mortgagor’s initial 
default and a final judgment awarding possession to the 
                                                          
165 (testimony of Elizabeth M. Lynch) (“In our experience, homeowners 
. . . in one- to four-family houses, rarely abandon their houses. They usually 
maintain the property and try to work with the bank to get a modification.”). 
331 Stoffer v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety of Huntington, 907 N.Y.S.2d 38, 45 
(App. Div. 2010) (“Where the Legislature has not expressly forbidden local 
governments from superseding state law, a local government may 
nevertheless be prohibited from enacting superseding legislation, pursuant to 
the doctrine of preemption, where the State has evidenced an intent to occupy 
the field.”); see also Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2721; Hearings, supra note 1, at 
85 (testimony of Michael P. Smith). 
332 See Stoffer, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 45. 
333 See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2721. 
334 Michael Powell & Nicholas Confessore, Dysfunction Displaces Work 
in Distracted Albany, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/03/06/nyregion/06albany.html (“The State Senate can’t get 32 votes to 
agree that today is Thursday.” (quoting Daniel J. O’Donnell, Assemblyman, 
N.Y.C.) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
335 See supra Part III. 
336 See supra Part V. 
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mortgagee, especially in the increasingly common scenario when 
the owner “walks away.” By providing a source of funding for 
necessary repairs, the four-factor equitable test helps reinforce 
existing eviction-protection measures for tenants and serves as a 
backstop against constructive eviction, blight, and the loss of 
affordable housing through predatory equity. Finally, though 
proponents face several challenges, codifying a duty or a 
compliance-bond requirement will also go a long way toward 
realizing Milbank’s potential to solve this persistent problem.337 
 
                                                          
337 Jim Dwyer, The Mortgage Was Like a Shell Game; So Is 
Responsibility in 3 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/04/29/nyregion/subprime-mortgage-in-bronx-building-
where-3-died-in-fire.html. 
